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TYNER, BEVERLY BERNARD. The Legal Aspects of Teacher 
Dress and Grooming in the United States. (1980) 
Directed by* Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 166. 
Historically teachers have been restricted in dress and 
grooming more than have other citizens. In many instances 
teachers have been reprimanded or dismissed for appearing 
at work dressed or groomed in a manner considered 
unconventional by school officials and the citizenry in gen­
eral. Although present restrictions on teacher dress and 
grooming are somewhat more flexible than those previously 
exercised, school officials still attempt to control many 
aspects of a teacher's appearance. As a result, the past two 
decades have seen significant litigation in the areas of 
teacher dress and grooming. 
The purpose of this study was to provide school officials 
with a comprehensive set of data concerning the legal aspects 
associated with the dress and grooming of teachers in the 
United States. The study also identified the constitutional 
protections given teachers in support of their chosen mode of 
dress and grooming and the reasons given by local school 
boards for regulating a teacher's appearance. 
Data and information for this study were obtained from 
a comprehensive analysis and review of the major court 
cases which relate to the dress and grooming of teachers. 
Legal precedents and trends were identified and the following 
conclusions were drawn: 
1. The courts have established two bases for the con­
stitutional protection of teachers who object to regulations 
controlling their dress and grooming. These include the 
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religion and 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prohibiting the depriva­
tion of life, liberty, or property of any person without 
due process of law 
2. The teacher is usually protected under the Consti­
tution if his appearance is seen as an expression of per­
sonality, heritage, race, or culture, as long as it does not 
impair the educational process 
3. When dress or grooming is considered to be a form 
of symbolic speech and is thus very close to pure speech, 
e.g., the wearing of black armbands, the First Amendment 
protection is high 
4. Local school boards and administrators must be pre­
pared to establish a need for their dress and grooming 
regulations 
5. The teacher must bear the burden of proof and show 
that the regulation is arbitrary and discriminatory when the 
facts in the case indicate that the board has, within its 
implied powers, the right to enforce the dress or grooming 
regulation 
6. The school board must bear the burden of proof and 
demonstrate a rational relationship between the necessity 
and desirability of the rule if it is established that the 
constitutional rights of the teacher have been violated 
7. A teacher cannot be lawfully dismissed for his dress 
or grooming unless: (1) there is a published policy prohibiting 
the dress and grooming, (2) the teacher is given notice of 
the policy and of the consequences of not adhering to it, 
and (3) a hearing is held to judge the specific alleged vio­
lation 
8. The courts usually treat rules of "dress" differ­
ently from rules of "grooming" because clothing can be more 
easily changed after the teacher leaves the school grounds 
than can a grooming style 
9. The courts generally uphold dress codes imposed by 
school officials as long as they are reasonable and are not 
enforced discriminately 
10. A grooming regulation is usually struck down by 
the courts unless the school board can prove that the 
teacher's grooming is causing disruption of the educational 
process, collapse of student discipline, or that his appear­
ance is untidy 
11. While the courts have been divided on the issue 
concerning the wearing of religious garb by public school 
teachers, the most recent court decision has upheld a 
teacher's right to appear in the classroom dressed in this 
garb, as long as the teacher does not impart religious doc­
trine to the students 
12. School boards and administrators are not immune 
from liability for damages in cases involving the infringe­
ment of constitutional rights in enforcing dress and grooming 
codes 
13* Determining what aspects of a teacher's appearance 
are constitutionally protected will continue to be a legal 
issue for the courts to decide 
The uniqueness of the dissertation lies in the proposed 
set of dress and grooming guidelines which, if followed, 
should enable school officials to make decisions which will 
be both educationally and legally sound. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Prom the time of the earliest attempts at colonization 
and settlements in the New World, educators have enjoyed a 
privileged status in the eyes of society. Respect for their 
superior levels of education and their abilities to impart 
that knowledge to others forced upon teachers the burden of 
exemplifying proper deportment in all aspects of public and 
private life. Teachers* rights to personal privacy were 
always balanced against the consequences of public behavior 
that was considered unacceptable. 
Without question the initial impression communicated 
by a teacher to the public was exhibited through personal 
appearance. It was expected and mandated that sedate attire 
and conservative habits of grooming would be maintained. 
Failure to adhere to these standards frequently resulted in 
immediate dismissal and public ostracism. 
As America became more industrialized and its citizenry, 
as a result, grew more sophisticated, social mores under­
went corresponding transitions. Public school teachers, how­
ever, were forced to remain outside the mainstream of these 
new lifestyles. They were slow in acquiring the acquiescence 
of the public and in shedding the stereotyped mold into which 
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they had been cast* Only in the past two decades have 
teachers' demands for the free exercise of their civil 
rights been given more than lip service by school authorities 
and the public in general* 
The civil rights movement of the sixties gave impetus 
to what had been, heretofore, an underground discontent 
among teachers regarding the regulation of their personal 
and professional lives. Educators, along with others who 
considered themselves unduly deprived of constitutional free­
doms, marched to the courthouse to ascertain their rights. 
The past twenty years have seen significant court liti­
gation within the areas of teacher dress and grooming. 
Teachers have felt that regulations controlling their appear­
ance have been in violation of their constitutional rights. 
School authorities, on the other hand, have argued that 
teachers, as models for students, must maintain a proper 
standard of dress and grooming to uphold a disciplined learn­
ing environment. The courts have been faced with balancing 
the circumstances to determine whether a school district's 
interest is sufficient to restrict teachers' constitutional 
rights. 
This is a legal-historical study designed to explore the 
legal aspects of teacher dress and grooming. The legal ram­
ifications are important to teachers, educational decision 
makers, and the public in general. Selected studies relating 
to the actual effects teacher dress and grooming have on 
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students are reviewed in order that judicial issues can be 
better interpreted. 
The purposes of this research study concerning the 
courts and teacher dress and grooming are fourfoldt 
1. To historically trace court decisions through 
all actions which have evolved in the areas of teacher 
dress and grooming 
2. To provide detailed analysis of illustrative 
landmark court cases in the areas of teacher dress and 
grooming 
3. To clearly establish the judicial trends and 
directives of the courts in regard to teacher dress and 
grooming 
To provide school authorities with appropriate 
information in order that decisions regarding these 
issues be both educationally and legally sound 
Statement of the Problem 
School administrators and the courts, in dealing with 
the issues of teacher dress and grooming, are faced with 
the dilemma of balancing the individual rights of teachers, 
the concerns of parents, and the state's compelling interest 
in education. 
Considerable discussion has taken place in educational 
circles relative to the dress and grooming of teachers. 
Opinion varies as to the amount of emphasis that should be 
placed on these issues. The few research studies that have 
been conducted have yielded scattered results and have 
failed to substantiate the effect that dress and grooming 
may have had on students. 
This points up the necessity for examining the legal 
issues associated with teacher dress and grooming. Court 
decisions have been made, but syntheses of these decisions 
and their resultant ramifications are sparse. Moreover, 
specific guidelines based on this research need to be devel 
oped for use by school boards, administrators, and teachers 
Questions To Be Answered 
An important purpose of this study is to develop rea­
sonable legal guidelines for school authorities to utilize 
in making decisions concerning teacher dress and grooming. 
Research focuses on answering questions necessary to the 
development of the proposed guidelines. 
1. To what extent can school authorities constitution 
ally control a teacher's mode of dress and grooming? 
2. Can school officials constitutionally discipline 
or terminate the employment of a teacher because of noncon­
formity to conventional standards of dress and grooming? 
3* Do the courts treat the issues of teacher "dress" 
and teacher "grooming" as separate entities? 
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k. Based on the results of recent court decisions, 
what are the litigable issues? 
5» From an analysis of judicial decisions, are there 
specific trends to be determined? 
Scope of the Study 
This is a research study of the legal ramifications 
of teacher dress and grooming as it has developed in the 
public schools of the United States. The research describes 
the extent to which these issues have been challenged and 
litigated, the reasons for litigation, the results of major 
court cases, and the possible effects these court decisions 
may have on school boards and school officials. The 
research is concerned, not only with an analysis of decisions 
in pertinent court cases, but also with synthesizing the 
implications of these separate decisions. Discussion of 
the consequences upon the future of teacher dress and 
grooming is rendered. 
Although this study reviews selected educational 
research dealing with the significance teacher dress has on 
teacher effectiveness, no attempt is made to settle this 
controversial issue. 
Based upon the research findings and included in the 
summary are some practical applications for those concerned 
with seeking changes in the present system. 
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Methods. Procedures, and Sources of Information 
To establish the need for this research, a search was 
made of Dissertation Abstracts for related topics. The 
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. Education Index, 
and Index to Legal Periodicals were used to locate relevant 
journal articles. 
The basic research technique used in conducting this 
research study involved examination and analysis of the 
available primary and secondary resources concerning the 
legal aspects of teacher dress and grooming. 
A variety of books on school law and teacher rights 
were reviewed for pertinent information. A computer search 
conducted through the Educational Resources Information 
Center (ERIC) also provided useful materials. The Encyclo­
pedia of Educational Research summarized general research 
on the subject. 
Primary sources were those applicable federal and 
state court cases located through the National Reporter Sys­
tem. the American Digest System. Corpus Juris Secundum, and 
American Jurisprudence. More recent court cases were 
examined and reviewed as found in the NOLPE School Law 
ESBfiElSE. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purposes of this study, the following selected 
terms are definedt 
Disruption. Any event which significantly interrupts 
the educational process. 
In loco parentis. (Latin for "in place of the parent. 
Being charged with some of the responsibilities of the 
parent. 
Litigation. The act or process of carrying on a law­
suit. 
Religious garb. Those clothes or symbols unique to a 
particular order of a particular church, whose wearers are 
dedicated to religious work under the direction of that 
church.* 
Teacher dress. That apparel which can be changed 
p 
immediately when a teacher gets home from school. This 
includes badges, insignia, buttons, armbands, jewelry, 
makeup, and other clothing not an integral part of the 
costume. 
Teacher grooming. Those parts of a teacher's appear­
ance which can not be easily altered when a teacher enters 
3 
his personal life. These include control of hair, beards, 
sideburns, mustaches, goatees, and other facial hair. 
•^Thomas Plygare, The Legal Rights of Teachers (Bloom-
ington, Indiana! Phi Delta Kappa Education Foundation, 
1976), p. 31. 
^Ibid. 3it>id. 
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Significance of the Study 
The mode of dress and grooming practices of teachers 
has been widely debated by teachers, school authorities, 
and the public in general. Although the controversy has 
been extant virtually from the beginning of the American 
public school system, its focus has changed with the times* 
Whereas teachers of the early 1900s were faced with denun­
ciations for bobbed hair and short-sleeved dresses, the 
controversy today is more likely to be concerned with short 
skirts and beards* 
The post-industrial age has seen dramatic expansion in 
the civil rights of teachers as part of a more general move­
ment toward the increased recognition of human rights.2* An 
increasing number of teachers argue against school board 
restrictions imposed upon them. They feel that dress and 
grooming are personal matters, and that they should be 
allowed to dress as they like. Many school boards, however, 
believe it is their responsibility to insure that a teacher's 
appearance is in accordance with the professional standards 
of the community.It seems that the courts have reached 
a crossroads in deciding just where teachers' rights end 
**Louis Fischer, "The Civil Rights of Teachers in Post-
Industrial Society," High School Journal 6l (May 1978)*380-
92. 
^Louis Fischer and David Schimmel, The Civil Rights of 
Teachers (New Yorki Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1973)» 
and the state's compelling interest in education begins. 
This is precisely the status of the issues of teacher dress 
and grooming. 
The current urgency of this problem is indicated by 
the fact that an overwhelming majority of cases dealing 
with these issues have been heard since the late sixties. 
There is little consistency among the decisions on the 
extent to which a teacher has a right to freedom of appear­
ance, or the degree to which school authorities may restrict 
it.^ In writing the decisions, judges have settled the ques 
tions in a variety of ways—on constitutional grounds, on 
the reasonableness of school policies, and on general 
principles. 
Rapidly changing styles of dress and grooming will cer­
tainly continue to give rise to the controversy that sur­
rounds this issue. Thus, this study is significant in that 
it provides future educational decision makers with a compre 
hensive analysis of the legal aspects of teacher dress and 
grooming. The study also establishes a set of legally 
sound guidelines which may deter further litigation in 
these areas. 
C. Hudgins, Jr., "Are Teachers Subject to Dress 
Codes?" NASSP Bulletin 55 (February 1971)«79-8^. 
10 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of the study is divided into three major 
parts. Chapter II contains a review of literature related 
to teacher dress and grooming. This section goes beyond 
the legal limits and reviews issues and research pertaining 
to these areas. These are included to enhance the legal 
aspects so that cases may be more appropriately analyzed. 
The status of present dress and grooming regulations is 
reviewed, and discussion of court involvement is rendered. 
Chapter III includes an historical narrative of the 
major legal issues related to teacher dress and grooming. 
The legal basis for court involvement is discussed with 
emphasis on (1) dress and grooming as a religious freedom, 
(2) dress and grooming as symbolic speech, and (3) dress 
and grooming as a liberty or privacy interest worthy of 
due process. 
The fourth chapter contains a general listing and dis­
cussion of court cases which refer to the general topic of 
teacher appearance. The first category of cases includes 
those landmark decisions relating to the broad constitu­
tional issues of dress and grooming. Other categories of 
cases selected for review in this section include cases 
related to the wearing of religious garb by public school 
teachers, teacher dress, and teacher grooming. 
The final chapter of the study includes a review and 
summary of information obtained from the review of literature 
11 
and analysis of selected court decisions. The questions 
posed in the introductory chapter are reviewed and answered. 
A listing of legally sound criteria and recommendations for 
controlling teacher dress and grooming are given. Recommen­
dations for further study conclude the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Overview 
Traditionally teachers have been expected to give 
proper attention to their dress and grooming. Both the 
favorable reaction of students and the enhancement of the 
quality of the learning environment have been justifications 
for demanding that teachers present a pleasing appearance. 
An historical review of the literature serves to lend cre­
dence to the legitimacy of the controversy which continues 
to surround the issue today. 
While many educational issues explored through 
research have given strength to opposing viewpoints, such 
is not the case in the areas of teacher dress and grooming. 
Paucity of materials reveals that researchers have all but 
neglected investigation into these areas. This is not to 
say, however, that the public and school authorities have 
been equally reticent to comment on and invoke regulations 
to control the appearance of teachers. On the contrary, 
constrictive statements regarding dress and grooming have 
been made either an integral part of the contractual agree­
ment or have been written into policies of local governing 
boards. This inconsistency, that is, the writing of policy 
without benefit of adequate corroborating research, has 
13 
resulted in complicating the decision-making process 
regarding teacher dress and grooming issues. 
Widely variant opinions still abound today as to the 
relevance of dress and grooming to teacher effectiveness. 
Many citizens, parents, teachers, and administrators still 
concur that dress and grooming continue to be important com­
ponents of the educational process and are reflections of 
the professionalism of teachers. Those opposing this phi­
losophy feel that control over these personal matters is 
an infringement upon their constitutional rights. 
Strict control and enforcement of dress and grooming 
regulations began to fade with the advent of the sixties 
and the civil rights movement. Teachers marched to the 
courthouse to demand their rights and to be assured that 
they, like students, did not "shed their constitutional 
rights at the schoolhouse gate.'1"*" Few school boards pres­
ently stipulate specific dress codes for teachers, and those 
which do exist are flexible and are based on the foundation 
of reasonableness. 
Involvement by the courts ushered in a new era of free­
dom and equal protection for those in the teaching profession. 
The courts have carefully scrutinized school board regula­
tions which seek to establish standards regarding a teacher's 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis­
trict, 393 U.S. 503. 89 S.Ct. 733. 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)» 
appearance and have considered teacher dress and grooming 
as forms of constitutionally protected expression* 
Although these issues are far from settled, teachers 
are now able to move ahead, firm in the knowledge that 
their interests, as teachers and as individuals, will be 
considered and will be balanced against the state's com­
pelling interest in education. 
Historical Perspective 
People have been conscious of personal appear­
ance and fashion from the time our forefathers 
crawled out of what Judge Learned Hand so ono-
matopoetically referred to as the "primordial 
ooze.H3 
Roman, Grecian, and European citizens placed great 
importance on their styles of dress and hair. Sampson, for 
example, felt sapped of his strength when Delilah rid him 
II 
of his locks. 
The devotion man has given to his clothing and appear 
ance can be traced from the ancient Egyptians to Henry VIII 
armor. Dress often conveyed a message, 
whether it be one of martyrdom in the sackcloth 
and ashes of the early Christians, respect for 
God in the skullcaps worn by many Jews, or 
achievement and calling in the regalia worn in 
academic processions.5 
2Robert H. Chanin, Protecting Teacher Rights (Washing­
ton i National Education Association, 1970J» p. 14. 
3East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, 562 F.2d 838 2nd Cir. (1977)* 
4Ibid. 5ibid. 
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Robes have been worn by many priests and judges as symbols of 
authority and the monk's baldness has been a sign of asceticism. 
Englishmen of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wore 
powdered wigs as symbols of wisdom, authority, and influence. 
Conversely, dress has been used to signify restriction 
of action in the military, in prisons, and in parochial 
schools# Leaders have deprived these groups of the privi­
lege of expressing their individualities through dress in 
the hope that such restriction would result in more con­
formity of action and, subsequently, would be the means by 
which stricter discipline could be maintained. 
Throughout history instances of oppression accomplished 
by body-tegument conformity can be noted. Following the 
Manehus* invasion of China in 16*j4, the conquerors sought to 
consolidate their power by requiring the population to wear 
a prescribed hair style and clothing. Many of these people 
chose to die rather than conform to these symbols of ser­
vitude. In an attempt to impose a more western lifestyle 
upon his country, Peter the Great imposed a heavy tax on the 
beards that were universally worn by seventeenth-century 
Russian men. Heavy religious significance was placed on 
these beards in the Russian Orthodox Church, and many men, 
after shaving their beards, saved them and requested that 
they be placed in their coffins to insure entry into the 
heavenly kingdom. These traditions of culture, along with 
others, and the importance assigned to dress and grooming 
16 
were subsequently brought to this country by the earliest 
6 
explorers and settlers. 
Historically, Americans have demanded that their public 
and religious servants conform to prescribed standards of 
deportment and dress. Since the very early history of this 
country, public expectations concerning proper dress and 
grooming have been far more restrictive for teachers than 
for the average citizen. 
This situation was reinforced in colonial New England 
by the fact that religion and education were nearly indis­
tinguishable. This concept was so firmly entrenched that 
it was still in evidence as late as 1841. An annual report 
of the board of education in Boston expressed the necessity 
for teachers to set examples for students. 
If then, the manners of the teacher are to 
be imitated by the pupils, if he is the glass, 
at which they "do dress themselves," how strong 
is the necessity that he should understand those 
nameless and innumerable practices, in regard to 
deportment, dress* conversation, and all personal 
habits, that constitute the difference between 
a gentleman and a clown.< 
Evidence of the importance of teacher dress in the late 
1800s can be found in an article that appeared in a popu­
lar teacher's magazine: 
Dress is always more or less an indicator of 
character, and public opinion of us will be partly 
governed by it. Public opinion makes or unmakes 
6Ibid. 
^Willard S. Elsbree, The American Teacher (New York: 
American Book Company, 1939), p* 297* 
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our reputations as teachers and therefore, we may 
not entirely ignore it, even from a business point 
of view--for on our success hangs our bread and 
butter.8 
The article went on to offer suggestions on a teacher's 
proper appearance* It recommended neatness, which included 
clean clothes, combed hair, and polished shoes* Plain 
clothes, rather than fancy, in colors of gray, brown, or any 
neutral shade were preferable* Jewelry was disallowed as 
proper adornment for a proper teacher. Good taste and com­
mon sense were acknowledged as guides to appropriate dress*^ 
In determining the qualities in dress which would be 
most admired in a prospective teacher, one school official 
voiced a strong dislike for careless and untidy dressing. 
He furthermore suggested that a teacher who wore tight 
dresses, collars, or shoes was thought to have "no command 
of her mind or temper; the whole intellectual and emotional 
tone is lowered, just as the physical powers are limited."10 
There was a preference for a teacher whose dress was neat, 
well chosen, and hygienic over one who was untidy or who 
dressed in violation of well-known laws of health*11 
®Eugene Harrell, "A Teacher's Dress," The North Caro­
lina Teacher 1 (June 1883)»249* 
9lbid., pp. 24-9-250. 
10"Dress of Teachers," The North Carolina Teacher 5 
(January 1892)*249-250• 
Hlbid. 
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The turn of the century brought few changes for 
teachers in the way that their lives were controlled by 
school authorities and the public. In the early 1900s, a 
country school teacher was dismissed when the wives of 
several prominent citizens protested the poor dress the 
teacher maintained on her salary of forty dollars a month. 
A westlthy patroness of a private school voiced concern when 
a teacher wore a work shirt with a soft collar, resulting 
12 
in the subsequent dismissal of the teacher. 
In 1915 one teaching contract forbade a female teacher 
to dress in bright colors, to dye her hair, to wear less 
than two petticoats, or to wear dresses more than two inches 
above the ankle.jn Santa Paula, California, in 1924, one 
teacher was dismissed solely because she bobbed her hair 
when the school board strictly prohibited it. As late as 
1928, women teachers in a West Virginia town were required 
to fasten their galoshes up all the way. Sleeveless dresses, 
sheer stockings, and cosmetics were also banned or discouraged 
in their turn."^ 
It is interesting to note that "pedagogue" is the Greek 
word for a kind of slave, but the commonly held connotation 
*2Marguerite Wilkinson, "Are Teachers Underpaid?" 
Independent (December 1919)*173* 
*3David Rubin, The Rights of Teachers (New York* Double-
day and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 11?. 
^Howard Beale, Are American Teachers Free? (New York* 
Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1936), pp. 390-391. 
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of the word is "teacher." Accordingly, teachers in the early 
history of this coiintry were treated much like second-class 
citizens. The following excerpts from a teaching contract 
are illustrative of the stringent controls under which a 
teacher accepted a position in the 1920s. 
I promise to take a vital interest in all phases 
of Sunday-school work, donating of my time, ser­
vice, and money without stint for the uplift and 
benefit of our community. 
I promise to abstain from all dancing, immodest 
dressing, and any other conduct unbecoming to a 
teacher and a lady. 
I promise not to go out with any young men except 
in so far as it may be necessary to stimulate 
Sunday-school work. 
I promise not to fall in love, become engaged, or 
to be secretly married. 
I promise not to encourage or tolerate the least 
familiarity on the part of any of my boy pupils. 
I promise to sleep at least eight hours a night, 
to eat carefully9 and to take every precaution to 
keep in the best health and spirits, in order that 
I may be better able to serve my pupils. 
I promise to remember that I owe a duty to the 
townspeople who are paying me my wages, that I 
owe respect to the school board and the superin­
tendent that hired me, and that I shall consider 
myself at all times the willing servant of the 
school board and the townspeople.^5 
These restrictions reflected the folkways and mores of 
the times, but were applied more strictly to teachers, per­
haps, than to other public figures. Although only one sec­
tion of the contract directly pertained to teacher dress, 
^t. Minehan, "The Teacher Goes Job-Hunting," The 
Nation 12^ (August 1927)1606.  
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it is important to note the stringent controls under which 
a teacher was placed* 
The life of a teacher was similar to that of a goldfish 
in a glass bowl and, much like that of a minister, was 
closely regulated by public rules and expectations. 
The explanation for this lies in the nature of 
the business in which they are engaged* Entrusted 
with the responsibility of instructing the young, 
they stand in loco parentis before the law and 
the public and are expected to keep themselves 
above reproach and to be subservient to the wishes 
of the most pious patrons in the community.1" 
Thus parents, as well as the community, saw the role 
of the teacher as one of providing an adult model for 
children. Life in rural America called for almost constant 
face-to-face confrontation with students, parents, and the 
community. These restrictions on teachers made it virtually 
impossible for them to separate their private from their 
professional lives. 
That public school employees should bow submissively 
to these stringent rules and regulations can be explained 
by the fact that job opportunities during this period were 
very limited, especially for young, unmarried females* 
These restrictions, therefore, were of little concern. 
Many prospective teachers cared nothing for their loss of 
freedom, nor realized how limited in their dress and activ­
ities they were to be. They wanted only to draw their 
salaries with as little conflict as possible* 
^Eiebree, The American Teacher, p* 296. 
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A book written in 1925» concerning the problems of 
teachers, also addressed the issues of dress and grooming. 
The author encouraged modesty in dress that did not exhibit 
"showiness or dowdiness."*? He further emphasized that the 
criterion that should be met in choosing the proper dress 
is one of "good taste."*® 
If controls were imposed in the matter of teacher 
dress, the use of cosmetics and jewelry was considered to 
be even more taboo. "Painting, powdering, and mutilation 
of the ears" were strictly forbidden in the schoolhouse, 
and considered to be very distasteful adornments to be worn 
19 
in public. "Probably there is no situation which cannot be 
20 
met as successfully without the adornments as with them." 
A couplet from Pope seems to best summarize the views 
held by most people concerning the dress and grooming of 
teachers during this era* 
Be not the first by whom the new is tried, 
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.21 
An early rebellion by teachers was voiced in 1917 when 
a school board designated that teachers wear ankle-length 
smocks in the day when knee-length dresses were fashionable. 
The teachers were victors in this round when they earned the 
support of the state superintendent and the press. In a 
17 
John C. Almack and Albert Lang, Problems of the 
Teaching Profession (Cambridge, Massachusetts! The Riverside 
Press, 1925), pp. 304-305• 
18Ibid. 19Ibid. 20Ibid. 21Ibid. 
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similar case in Chicago in 1925» Superintendent Ray McAndrew 
dictated that teachers wear long loose skirts* but the Fed­
eration of Teachers was strong enough to defy his wishes* 
An Arkansas school board also attempted to control strictly 
a teacher's dress when they promulgated a rule prohibiting 
• • • the wearing of transparent hosiery, low-
necked dresses, or any style of clothing tending 
toward immodesty in dress, or the use of face 
paint or cosmetics.22 
When confronted with the legality of this regulation, the 
school board was supported by the courts.23 
By the 1920s not all teachers were meekly submitting 
to the archaic thinking of employing boards. Following 
World War I, a combination of circumstances had given teachers 
a new frontier of freedom that was unprecedented. Teacher 
training had become more specialized with the professionali-
zation of teachers, while the war had hastened the industri­
alization of the country. The old concepts of morality, 
long established social controls, and ancient standards of 
conduct were, in many areas, destroyed by wartime experi-
2U ences.^ 
Young teachers, affected by these social changes, cast 
aside the old beliefs and developed a new attitude toward 
22Almack and Lang, Problems of the Teaching Profession, 
pp. 30^-305* 
23lbid. 
2i*ttoward Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in 
American Schools (New Yorki Charles Scribner's Sons, Inc», 
1941), p. 243. 
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the teaching profession. The activities of teachers, which 
had made them subject to dismissal before World War I, 
were now given a more liberal view. "Freedom is now per­
mitted in dress, in conduct, and in habits that would once 
have been considered 1 immoral* by a stricter, pre-war 
generation."2^ 
The degree of freedom varied with the community and 
section of the country in which the teacher resided. In -
actuality, it was only the teacher in the big city who saw 
any real change. Beale found rural communities still quite 
restrictive through the late 1930s.2^ The community, in 
any case, still expected the teacher to lead an exemplary 
life upon which children might model their own actions. 
Many teachers found little freedom in their personal lives 
until the tenure laws were enacted in their respective 
states. 
This movement toward freedom lost momentum during the 
depression. The country and the state of education were in 
a period of severe deprivation, and the discussion of 
teachers' freedom seemed meaningless. The issues of dress 
and grooming lost importance, for many found it difficult 
to clothe themselves in the most modest way. In a time when 
the economy required a minimum number of teachers to be 
25Ibid. 
26Beale, Are American Teachers Free? pp. 37^-375. 
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employed, it was foolish and dangerous to express opinions 
that opposed school authorities. This insecurity went a 
long way toward destroying teacher quest for freedom.2? 
By 1939t however, teachers enjoyed a great deal more 
freedom than had those of the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
This freedom was reflected not only by the sweeping social 
upheaval of post-World War I, but also was the result of the 
new status which many women were beginning to enjoy in the 
eyes of the public. The status of women had been drastically 
altered forevermore by the excesses of the twenties and the 
deprivation-ridden thirties. No longer content or allowed 
by economic circumstances to remain in the work force only 
until marriage returned them to their traditional roles as 
full-time homemakers, women, including teachers, were begin­
ning to demand more consideration in their public and 
professional lives. 
The post-industrial era, following World War II, 
ushered in a new expansion in the rights of teachers. This 
was accompanied by a movement toward increased recognition 1 
of human rights which established a kind of "new morality," 
giving people in general and teachers in particular more 
28 
rights, both personally and professionally. 
2?Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American 
Schools, p. 26?. 
2®Pischer, "The Civil Rights of Teachers in Post-
Industrial Society," p. 383. 
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A study conducted in 1950 clearly showed a dramatic 
Change in public attitudes. Calloway surveyed a sample of 
Missouri teachers and found that 75 percent of those who 
responded felt no public pressure against dancing, smoking, 
or card playing. In response to social drinking, 58 per­
cent felt that this practice was frowned upon by the public 
while 20 percent said that they found no opposition to their 
participation in activities open to other citizens.2^ In 
analyzing the results of this study, Story concluded that 
the evidence "seems to point to a growing change in public 
attitudes toward teachers."3® 
The prosperity enjoyed by the nation following World 
War II, in the late 1940s and 1950s, was followed by an 
era in which many youth initiated a quest for quality rather 
than quantity of life. There was an increased interest in 
the rights of the individual as expressed in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The National Education Association and the 
American Federation of Teachers became more militant and 
pushed for the rights of teachers. Women joined the ranks 
in requesting equalization of rights and were backed by such 
organizations as the National Organization of Women which 
29b. Calloway, "Are Teachers Under Community Pressure?" 
School and Community 458 (May 1951)*83. 
3°t, Story, "Public Attitude Is Changing Toward Teachers* 
Personal Freedom," Nation's Schools 45 (November 1950)«70. 
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worked for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. A com­
bination of these events had a profound effect upon the 
entire fabric of life. There was an upsurge of splinter 
groups—hippies, yippies, and flower children—who viewed 
themselves as symbols of this quality of life movement. 
Cultural changes, such as those experienced during this 
era, are usually accompanied by drastic changes in fashion 
and hair style. This movement was accompanied by shorter 
dresses for women, longer hair for men, and a generally less 
formal mode of dress. Concern for the short dresses worn 
during this period was voiced by one teacher in a popular 
education magazines 
When in the latest fashion 
So attractively you've dressed, 
Won't you try some exercises 
As just a little test? 
Stand before your mirror 
Full length upon the wall, 
Turn around, bend over 
As if picking up a ball. 
(Are garters peeking back at you? 
Stocking tops and flesh? 
Remember children's thoughts 
Can easily digress.) 
Next reach high into the air 
As on the chalkboard you write, 
Ask someone who's watching 
Exactly what's in sight. 
(Will small folks on lower chairs 
Get quite a different view? 
Is it Playtex they are seeing 
When they are watching you?) 
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Now sit before your mirror 
And try a pose or two, 
Like crossing right leg over left# 
As we are prone to do. 
You may be teaching something 
That needs some careful thought, 
But perhaps it's difficult 
To tell what they've been taught. 
While keeping up with fashion, 
Remeniber in the end, 
It's little things that really count, 
Like how to sit and bend. 
Jeanne Gaughan 
The Instructor (March 1968) 
Almost overnight men too transformed themselves from the 
close-cropped Ivy League look to emulate the Beatles' shaggy, 
carefree style. 
Teachers, in the past, were regulated by the historic 
doctrine of "teaching as a privilege."^ In accepting a posi 
tion, teachers were, in fact, giving up their constitutional 
rights. This doctrine has more recently been set aside by 
the courts, although some evidence of it still lingers. 
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the rights 
of public employees in the case of Kevishian v. Board of 
Regents.It repudiated the ancient distinction in consti­
tutional status between public and private employees whereby 
public employment, including academic employment, 
may be conditioned upon the surrender of 
3^-Fisher, "The Civil Rights of Teachers in Post-Indus­
trial Society," p. 383. 
32Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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constitutional rights which could not be 
abridged by direct government action.33 
The Supreme Court stated* 
• • • the theory that public employment may be 
denied altogether, may be subjected to any con­
ditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has 
been uniformly rejected .3** 
Public employees cannot be "regulated to a watered-down 
version of constitutional rights solely because they are 
public employees."35 
According to Chester Nolte, the board of education may 
legally expect the teacher to exhibit exemplary behavior 
and to comply with local mores in dress and conduct.^ It 
has also been established that teachers have a property 
interest in their jobs, and this is protected by a full 
range of constitutional rights. Along with these rights 
come certain responsibilities which must be accepted by the 
person. The very nature of the teaching profession calls 
for discretion and revocation of constitutional rights that 
are sometimes viewed as unreasonable.37 
Some school authorities today, nevertheless, attempt 
to control teachers* dress and grooming. The traditional 
battleground has changed, however, and today's restrictions 
33ibid. 3^ibid. 
35Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U»S. 493, 500 (196 7 ) .  
3^Chester Nolte, "Teacher's Image, Conduct Important," 
American School Board Journal 15^ (January 196?)«29-
^Fischer, "The Civil Rights of Teachers in Post-
Industrial Society," p. 383. 
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are more likely to be those that forbid the wearing of jeans, 
sweat shirts, or see-through blouses. Men, who were not 
often subject to the strict dress and grooming requirements 
traditionally imposed on their female co-workers, are now 
the target of much of the litigation surrounding these 
issues. Although Sampson had flowing locks, Aristotle, 
Plato, Jesus, Moses, and Lincoln wore beards, and Uncle Sam 
sports a goatee, official discipline of those male teachers 
who have chosen to follow in their footsteps has been almost 
inevitable.38 
The cultural influences of the past still informally 
control the lives of teachers today. This is especially 
true of small communities where one religion is dominant, 
and the selection of teaching personnel is systematically 
based upon these religious affiliations. A common example 
of this is found in the control of hair, beards, and mus­
taches. Many advisors to beginning teachers seeking posi­
tions suggest shaving facial hair and keeping a moderate 
hair style for interviews to prevent presenting a bad first 
impression that could lose a job offer. After one is estab­
lished in his profession and accepted for his talents, these 
rights can be more freely exercised. 
One reason for the dramatic expansion of teachers' 
rights is the support offered from professional organizations. 
The American Federation of Teachers and the National 
38Rubin, The Rights of Teachers, p. 11?. 
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Education Association have shown a great amount of supportive 
interest in these matters. The National Education Associa­
tion, for example, has established the Dushane Fund to deal 
with issues involving teachers' rights. Some of the cases 
have dealt with teacher dress and grooming, and the fund has 
offered both legal and financial support to those involved 
in such litigation. 
Review of Related Research 
Although teacher-rating scales frequently include an 
item asking respondents to assess teacher appearance, 
teacher effectiveness in relationship to teacher appearance 
is one aspect of teaching that has been greatly neglected 
in terms of research. "The inclusion of appearance on rating 
scales seems to imply that if teachers are to do a neat job 
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of teaching, they must do a neat job of dressing." It 
must be remembered that a teacher's effectiveness is multi­
dimensional and cannot be accurately determined by examining 
h, o 
single factors that contribute to it. Two research 
studies have been conducted to determine the effect a 
teacher's dress and grooming have on students. 
^^Tracy Menard, "An Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Teacher Effectiveness and Teacher Appearance," Journal of the 
Student Personnel Association for Teacher Education 13 
(September 197*0 * 2?. 
Zlq 
D. Ryans, "Prediction of Teacher Effectiveness," Ency­
clopedia of Education Research (October 1957)»1^86-1^91• 
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The purpose of a study done by Menard was to determine 
if the appearance of teachers had an impact on their effec­
tiveness based on the criteria of student ratings and student 
achievement.^ The researcher sought to answer the follow­
ing questions! 
Is there a significant difference in teacher 
effectiveness due to a difference in the appear­
ance of the teacher in two consecutive quarters 
of teaching? 
Can the student characteristics of sex, academic 
major, achievement, and socio-economic status be 
used efficiently in predicting teacher effective-
ness^|sed upon a difference in teacher appear-
smc © * 
A sample of 156 freshmen students at the University of 
Northern Colorado in 1972 was chosen for the study. The 
subjects were enrolled in a course in introductory psychology 
with two classes meeting during the winter quarter and two 
in the spring quarter. All received instruction on the same 
material, were taught by an identical method, and were evalu­
ated with the same test instruments. The only variable 
between the winter and spring quarters was in the appearance 
of the instructor. The instructor during the winter quarter 
wore long hair, a full beard, and was dressed in faded blue 
jeans, a work shirt, and boots. His attire for the spring 
quarter consisted of a white shirt, tie, dress slacks, and 
^Menard, "An Analysis of Teacher Effectiveness and 
Teacher Appearancep. 27. 
^2ibid. 
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dress shoes* He wore short hair and had a clean-Bhaven face* 
The study concluded that there was no difference in teacher 
effectiveness as measured by student ratings or student 
achievement* regardless of the appearance of the teacher. 
The student characteristics of sex, academic major, achieve­
ment, and socio-economic status did not aid in the prediction 
of teacher effectiveness* The researcher made the following 
inferences based on her research. 
First, many public school districts and some colleges 
and universities have dress codes, either written or implied, 
for students and teachers. Although caution should be main­
tained in generalizing the results of this study to all 
situations, the implication that a certain standard of 
dress does not reflect teacher effectiveness is certainly 
relevant, and the abandonment of dress codes might be in 
order. 
Secondly, school officials in charge of hiring teaching 
personnel are sometimes reluctant to employ someone whose 
appearance does not fit the stereotyped, conservative image 
of a teacher. The results of this study indicate that school 
officials should emphasize factors other than appearance 
ifZf 
when selecting future personnel* 
There are further implications for dress in relation to 
teachers* Administrators, counselors, and others should 
**3lbid. ^Ibid* 
33 
be cognizant of the possibility that appearance does not 
significantly alter effectiveness when teachers are inter­
acting with young adults.^ 
Again, the majority of the rating scales for teacher 
effectiveness contain an appearance item, although it may 
be couched in terms such as "well-groomed" or "neatly 
dressed." This study implies that an appearance item might 
be useless in measuring teacher effectiveness and, there­
fore, could be excluded from the scales.^ 
Although the results of this study indicate that there 
is no relationship between teacher effectiveness and teacher 
appearance, further research is needed to validate and 
clarify the role that teacher appearance plays in the com­
plex teaching-learning process.^ 
In a similar study, Rollman made an exploratory investi­
gation to uncover potential effects, if any, of teachers* 
styles of dress upon students* perceptions of teachers* 
LQ 
characteristics. The researcher produced two sets of 
stimulus photographs made of male and female teachers from 
the waist down. Each set of photographs contained three 
models exhibiting relatively formal, informal, and moderate 
^ibid. ^6Ibid. ^Ibid. 
^®Steve Rollman, "Nonverbal Communication in the 
Classroom: Some Effects of Teachers* Style of Dress Upon 
Students* Perceptions of Teachers* Characteristics," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1977)• 
3k 
dress of the male and female. A sanple of one hundred 
university students was selected to view the stimulus photo­
graphs with fifty to rate the male and the other fifty to 
rate the female. Each group was instructed to note char­
acteristics of the teachers. 
Based on student responses* the researcher concluded 
that a male teacher who dresses informally would enhance 
the probability of being perceived as sympathetic toward 
students* problems, would be friendly, and would be flexible. 
The moderately dressed male was perceived to be most stim­
ulating and clear. The male teacher most formally dressed 
was judged most knowledgeable, organized, and well-prepared 
l±Q 
for class. 7 
The very informally dressed female was considered to 
be very fair, sympathetic toward students* problems, 
enthusiastic, friendly, flexible, and stimulating. When 
moderately dressed, the female teacher was perceived to be 
the most clear. The female teacher most formally attired 
was thought to be well-organized and well-prepared for 
class. 
The results of this study point up the fact that a 
teacher*s style of dress does have some impact on students* 
perceptions of them. This clearly establishes a need for 
more serious attention to be given the subject by 
researchers. 
^9Ibid. 5°Ibid. 
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The very limited research that has been conducted 
concerning the importance of teacher dress and grooming 
makes it impossible to substantiate the scattered results* 
In both of the studies reviewed, college students were 
used as the sample populations* Serious attention should 
be directed to further exploration of this area using more 
varied age groups as samples* 
Significance of Teacher Dress and Grooming 
Opinions vary as to the significance that should be 
placed upon teacher dress and grooming practices. Histor­
ically. the view was held that a teacher's proper dress 
and grooming were essential in maintaining discipline and 
enhancing an atmosphere conducive to learning. More 
recently, however, many have questioned the real importance 
that these practices actually play in the overall effective­
ness of a teacher. 
A poll conducted by the National Education Association 
randomly selected five hundred members from the associa­
tion's records division to determine the opinions that 
teachers held relative to their dress and grooming in the 
classroom.^ Of the 28 percent of teachers who, responded, 
an overwhelming majority felt that teachers have a responsi­
bility to set an example for students in matters of 
51"Teachers* Dress and Grooming," Today's Education 58 
(January 1969)»^6-4?* 
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appearance, and many of the respondents elaborated their 
personal feelings on the questionnaire. 
One teacher stated that "teachers should set an 
example for youth in dress, morals, and all things—if 
they don't want to be examples# they shouldn't be teach-
52 
ing.M> A male teacher felt that it was unfair to impose 
dress codes on students when female teachers wore dresses 
six inches above the knee. Many of the teachers pointed out 
that a teacher's dress and grooming influence the entire 
tone of the classroom. The general feeling was one of respon­
sibility to be well-dressed with resulting respect and 
appreciation from students. 
The poll revealed that very few teachers had arbitrary 
dress or grooming standards imposed upon them. Again, the 
respondents felt that any established rules were unnecessary 
in light of the fact that, as professionals, teachers 
should automatically act and dress accordingly. In school 
systems where such standards of dress and grooming prevailed, 
few viewed this as an infringement on their individual 
rights.^ The limited sample used in this study restricts 
the validity of the findings. 
Another contention by some teachers is that, in order 
to do an outstanding job, the teacher must first earn the 
respect and admiration of students. To establish this rela­
tionship, a teacher must display self-confidence, and good 
52Ibid. 53ibid. 54Ibid. 
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grooming and attention to dress are important factors in 
helping to accomplish this goal* "A teacher's first 
responsibility—before she can sell her product—is to sell 
herself to her students."-^ Students have a strong feeling 
of admiration for an attractive-looking teacher. In order 
to obtain the distinction of being attractive, teachers 
must give careful attention to their good health, cleanli­
ness, and choice of wardrobe. 
Louana Trout, 196k National Teacher of the Year, always 
made a point of wearing shoes to match her dresses. She 
felt that she was paying her students a subtle compliment 
by "dressing up" for them. The trait individualized her 
and made her "Mrs. Trout" and not just another teacher.^ 
When one speaks of the importance of an attractive 
teacher, it should be noted that beauty is not a prerequi­
site for attractiveness. Children are "quick to see beauty 
whenever there is a trace of it."-*® Bright cheerful colors 
in choices of clothing, a special piece of clothing, or 
nicely manicured nails can all contribute to a teacher's 
attractiveness and are noticed by students. Morale is 
^^Lucy G. Mayo, "Attractive Packaging Helps Sell the 
Product," NEA Journal k2 (October 1953)*^5?• 
56Ibid. 
^"Teachers* Dress and Grooming," pp. 
5®Margaret 0. James, "She Walks in Beauty," Clearing 
House 18 (April 19^*0i**87-^88. 
38 
boosted in both teachers and students when teachers take 
an interest in their dress and grooming.-^ 
The opinions rendered thus far on teacher dress and 
grooming do not stand without opposition. Some teachers 
feel that "worrying less about dress codes for teachers and 
students and more about meaningful education would be a step 
forward."^0 A first-year teacher expressed concern that 
the way teachers dress makes students feel "stiff and out 
of it."^* This teacher felt that it would be more appropri­
ate for elementary teachers to dress like mothers in the 
home, and that high school teachers should wear a T-shirt 
and blue jeans. The feeling in both instances was that the 
child could better relate to a teacher dressed in familiar 
6 2 
attire with whom he could identify. 
Students also hold opinions on the dress and grooming 
of teachers. One fifthrgrade boy went so far as to say that 
he would try to flunk his grade if he had a teacher that met 
his expectations in attractiveness. This further indicates 
a preference by students for an attractive-looking teacher.^ 
59ibid. 
60"Teachers* Dress and Grooming," pp. 46-47. 
^Clara Cockerille, "Dear Miss North," Pennsylvania 
School Journal CXX (November 1971)»79« 
62Ibid. 
63Mayo, "Attractive Packaging Helps Sell the Product," 
p. 447. 
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An informal survey done in 1951 was carried out to 
determine if pupils paid attention to the clothes their 
teachers wore. The sample consisted of graduate and under­
graduate students who had attended both large and small 
public school systems. The study revealed students to be 
"acutely conscious of what teachers wore and how they 
d r e s s — a n d  t h e  m e m o r y  l i n g e r s  o n  f o r  y e a r s . M a n y  
students maintained vivid recollections of the dress of 
particular teachers and were anxious to discuss them. The 
way a teacher dressed often affected the way a student felt. 
One subject commented on a former teacher who always wore 
something with ruffles and frills. "I remember that she 
made me feel as gay as she looked."^ Another commented on 
a teacher who "seemed to be in the same black dress every 
day—her class was as dull as she looked."^ Other teachers 
identified in the study were remembered for variations in 
ties* costume jewelry, perfume, messiness, and monotonous 
one-color wardrobes. 
The evidence in this survey strongly suggests that 
pupils pay close attention to the way teachers dress. It 
further suggests that students are opinionated as to their 
likes and dislikes regarding the way teachers dress and 
groom themselves.^ 
^Helen Ellis, "Everyone Remembers What the Teacher 
Wore," Clearing House 26 (February 1952)i371-372. 
65lbid. 66Ibid. 6?Ibid. 
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Many parents feel that the dress and grooming of 
teachers contributes to the success or failure of the 
schools. This is not a recent criticism, but one that has 
been voiced for quite some time and is still in the fore­
front of educational issues. When New York City parents 
were questioned about their dissatisfaction with the school 
system, "mini-skirted women teachers and long-haired men 
teachers 'who don't act like men'" were listed among the 
causes.*>8 Parents have traditionally entrusted teachers 
to set examples for students, and many still expect the 
same considerations today. 
In many instances, the principal ultimately decides 
the fate of a teacher who deviates from standard dress and 
grooming practices. The radical changes in styles of dress 
and grooming in the 1960s have brought many principals pre­
cisely to this situation. The way in which an individual 
principal deals with these incidences of non-conforming 
dress and grooming directly relates to the importance that 
a principal places on the issue. 
An overwhelming majority of principals feel that 
teachers should set examples and use common sense in their 
own dress. They feel that the main consideration should be 
good taste—no matter what the fashion. The dress of a 
teacher should command the respect of the students in his 
68 
"Teachers' Dress and Grooming," p. ̂ 6. 
or her class. Inappropriate dress usually brings protests 
from other teachers and from parents who frown on this as 
a possible disruptive influence upon the learning that 
should be taking place in the classroom. One principal 
found that a woman who tried to look her best at school 
usually was enthusiastic and interested in her teaching.^9 
While many point out the importance and influence a 
teacher's dress and grooming have on the educational process* 
opinions vary as to the principals role in controlling 
these situations. "Within the limits of acceptable fashion, 
bounded by decency, a principal has no right to censor the 
dress of fellow professionals in the classroom."?0 The 
right to control dress and grooming should come only when 
a principal can clearly establish that this appearance 
proves disruptive in the classroom. 
A principal would be hard-pressed to prove that 
poor control is due to the attire of the teacher. 
In every school there is a teacher who could 
develop a good learning environment dressed in 
fig leaves, while another teacher in the school 
could not develop a comparable learning environ­
ment dressed in armor.71 
69sam Stinple, Audine Agend, and John Gist, "Princi­
pal's Problem: Appropriate Dress for Teachers," Instructor 
179 (February 1970)»39. 
7°Ibid. 71Ibid. 
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Status of Teacher Dress and Grooming Regulations 
Available information indicates a scarcity of regula­
tions that currently control the dress and grooming of 
teachers. A survey, conducted by the National Education 
Association in 1969* revealed that very few school systems 
arbitrarily imposed dress and grooming standards.^2 
A more recent survey, completed in 1978, furthar sub­
stantiates and updates these findings.Questionnaires 
were sent to one hundred rural and urban school districts, 
including two in each of the fifty states and one to the 
District of Columbia, to determine the status of dress and 
grooming regulations for teachers. The findings showed 
that very few school districts presently enforce dress or 
grooming codes for teachers. In instances where regulations 
did exist, only 11 percent reported that the principal had 
the option of dealing with dress and hair styles at the 
building level. This situation was more prevalent in rural 
than in urban settings. 
There has been a dramatic revision of dress codes in 
the last ten to fifteen years. An astounding 82 percent of 
those polled indicated that the dress and grooming regula­
tions in their schools have changed during this time. The 
Teachers' Dress and Grooming," pp. 46-^7* 
^^Bettye Johnson, "Goodbye to Dress Codes for Now," 
Phi Delta Kappa 61 (November 1979)*217* 
new trend has been directed toward flexibility and generality 
in regulations. 
Strict dress and grooming regulations have been vir­
tually eliminated for public school teachers, especially 
those dealing with hair styles. Those regulations that do 
remain deal mainly with cleanliness, neatness, appropriate-
?L5 
ness, safety, and health. J 
A look at some representative dress and grooming codes 
gives further evidence to substantiate the relaxation and 
generalization of policies. 
The following dress code was mandated in 1978 in the 
Madawaska Public Schools in Madawaska, Mainei 
Teaching as a profession demands setting a good 
example for boys and girls in every possible way. 
As adults and professionals, teachers are expected 
to be guided in their grooming habits by what is 
most generally acceptable in the business and 
professional world. Dress that could be described 
as "sportswear" is not considered acceptable for 
teachers, unless it is appropriate to the specific 
class or activity.76 
This code adopts the traditional doctrine that recog­
nizes teachers as examples for students, but avoids harsh 
and unreasonable restrictions on their dress and grooming. 
This delegates more responsibility to the teacher and places 
less liability upon the school board. 
^Ibid. ?5ibid. 
76MTeachers* Dress Code," Educational Policies Service 
of the National School Boards Association, Madawaska Public 
Schools, Madawaska, Maine (1968). 
kk 
A policy on staff conduct, written in 1975» for the 
North Panola Consolidated School District, North Panola, 
Mississippi, clearly states that "conduct and dress should 
be a personal matter."?? The school board in this instance 
strongly encourages its staff to act and dress in a way 
that is a credit to the teaching profession. "The only 
limitations shall be those that affect professional per­
formance, health of associates and students, and level of 
community tolerance."?® More specifically, the board stated 
that any limitations would be» 
(1) to guard against jeopardizing the effectiveness 
of the teacher-student relationship; 
(2) to foster rather than destroy the popular con­
cept of "teacher"? 
(3) to set standards which will prevent too wide 
a deviation from normal business/professional 
attire and conduct; 
(4-) any other limits to demonstrate the harmony 
between stated school goals and expectations 
concerning teacher dress and conduct.79  
Again, the school board is very selective in its limitations, 
hoping to avoid lengthy and costly litigation. 
A more restrictive philosophy was adopted by the Super­
intendent of Schools in Newark, Ohio. She felt that 
restrictions on teacher dress should be regulated by 
77North Panola Consolidated School District, North 
Panola, Mississippi, Educational Policies Service of the 
National School Boards Association (1975)* 
7®Ibid. 79Ibid. 
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educational implications and the attitude of the people in 
the community. She considered the people of Newark to be 
very conservative in dress, and expected teachers to con­
form to these standards. The superintendent felt that, as 
long as public education continues to be primarily financed 
through taxes, the public will feel free to establish rules 
that affect educators. The statement on dress included 
flexibility in changing fashion as a part of the dress code. 
"Generally speaking, acceptable dress for males is a coat 
and necktie, and for ladies an appropriate dress."®0 
A dress code for teachers in New Jersey was based on 
the outcome of a case that established the school board's 
authority to enforce a dress code for its teaching staff 
members. In enforcing it, however, three tests of validity 
had to be passed. 
It must be reasonable; it must be consistent with 
statutes and rules of the State Board of Education; 
and its effect must be toward the maintenance and 
support of a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools*81 
An earlier dress code requiring men teachers to wear ties 
and coats at all times was considered to be unreasonable in 
that the rule did not serve a legitimate purpose in the 
operation of the school, despite the board's position that 
8°Loren H. Briggs, "A Statement on Staff Dress and 
Appearance," Educational Policies Service of the National 
School Boards Association (19?6). 
81Ibid. 
it was necessary to help train young students in decency 
and decorum. 
The public schools are increasingly avoiding formal, 
specific regulations pertaining to teachers* grooming and 
attire. Most policies are very general and give teachers 
leeway as long as health standards are observed and class­
room performance is not hindered. While many schools still 
observe dress codes for students, they have been abandoned 
for teachers generally, and are rarely mentioned in contracts. 
The future resolutions of this issue will probably lie 
in the power of collective negotiations contracts, typi­
cally by means of binding arbitration. An example of this 
is seen in a recent controversy that was resolved by an arbi­
trator in a Michigan school system. These arbitrations 
state that teachers can consider many situational variables 
such as age and maturity of students, the subject taught, 
and the health and safety factors of the situation. This 
Dp 
resolution could be less expensive than court involvement. 
Court Involvement 
Over the years, teachers have made significant gains 
in rights through court action. Legal bases for these rights 
stem from a number of clearly defined sources including con­
stitutions, both federal and state, and federal, state, and 
local statutes. 
®2Fischer and Schimmel, The Civil Rights of Teachers. 
p. 153. 
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The main sources of constitutional protection for the 
rights of teachers are found in the First Amendment guar­
antees of freedom of speech and religion, and the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The full text of the First Amendment and the relevant por­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: 
Amendment It 
Congress shall make no law respecting the 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.®3 
Amendment XIV: Section 1 
No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the law.8^ 
The courts have scrutinized with great care school 
board regulations that seek to establish standards regarding 
a teacher's appearance. They have viewed the appearance of 
teachers as a form of constitutionally protected expression, 
an aspect of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and an aspect of privacy to which they are entitled.®^ 
®^U.S. Const, amend. I, sec. 1. 
®%J.S. Const, amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
®5chanin, Protecting Teacher Rights, p. 14. 
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In considering these issues, the courts have dealt 
with "dress" and "grooming" as two separate entities* 
"Grooming" is generally interpreted to mean beards, mus­
taches, and length and styling of hair. Court interpreta­
tion of "dress," on the other hand, usually denotes attire 
which can be removed after school hours.®^ 
Much controversy has surfaced in attempting to control 
and regulate grooming as it has been defined here* Although 
the Constitution does not specifically address the issue, 
controls have been established so that states may not 
infringe upon the constitutional rights of teachers. The 
courts have designated the wearing of beards, mustaches, and 
hair styles as a constitutional right protected by the First 
Amendment as "symbolic speech."®'' 
In addition to the protection established in the First 
Amendment, some courts have found supplementary protection 
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
concept of "liberty" in this same amendment can be inter­
preted to include grooming* It is considered an arbitrary 
action by the school board to prohibit these grooming habits 
unless it can be proved that they interfere with the school's 
operation.®® 
®^Fischer and Schimmel, The Civil Rights of Teachers 
p. 152. 
87Ibid. 8®Ibid. 
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In dealing with a teacher's dress, the law is somewhat 
different. The courts generally uphold a school district's 
right to impose reasonable regulations. The distinction 
between "dress" and "grooming" becomes then a matter of 
permanency. After school a teacher is free to follow his 
or her personal taste in clothing. Beards and other facial 
foliage, however, cannot be removed for school hours and 
replaced afterwards in the same way as can short skirts, 
pants, or see-through blouses. 
The courts are thus faced with a balancing test which 
must weigh a teacher's right to wear what he wishes against 
the community's interest in placing adult models in schools 
who exemplify community standards, and whose appearance will 
minimize interference with the educational process. The 
courts, in these instances, tend to rule in favor of the 
school board. 
The issue of the wearing of religious garb by public 
school teachers has been in litigation, at various times, 
90 
since a landmark case was heard in 1894. In that case 
the authority of a local board of education was questioned 
when it employed nuns as teachers and permitted them to 
appear in the classroom wearing the habits of their order. 
8?Ibid. 
9°Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School District, 164 Pa. 
629, 30 A. 482 (1894). 
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To the present day, litigation has failed to resolve the 
issue to the satisfaction of all parties concerned* 
Those opposing the practice feel that the employment 
of nuns as teachers constitutes the use of public funds 
for sectarian instruction. The nuns reply that to deprive 
them of their positions because of their distinctive 
religious dress would be to deny them religious freedom 
established by the First Amendment. 
The wearing of religious garb by public school 
teachers has been challenged also on numerous occasions on 
the grounds that it violates state constitutional prohibi­
tions against sectarianism in the schools. 
Whether, in the absence of a state statute or 
state-level regulation forbidding it, local 
boards can permit the wearing of religious garb 
by teachers seems far from settled.91 
The right to employ also includes the right to dis­
charge, except as restricted by contractual or constitutional 
considerations. In many states, statutes provide that 
teachers may be dismissed only upon stated grounds. Where 
teachers have been dismissed because of their personal 
dress and grooming, boards have used, as grounds, immoral­
ity, insubordination, and neglect of duty. The courts have 
become involved, however, where the legality of the dismissal 
was questioned. 
Edmund Reutter, Jr. and Robert R. Hamilton, The 
Law of Public Education (Mineola, New York* The Foundation 
Press, 1976), p. 29. 
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During the 1800s and early 1900s, immorality was 
associated with dress which was not in accordance with 
community standards. The wearing of short skirts, makeup, 
and even transparent hosiery was considered immoral as late 
as the 1920s and constituted grounds for dismissal. The 
Supreme Court upheld regulations that prohibited dress and 
grooming that tended toward immodesty. This included the 
wearing of cosmetics and jewelry. 
As the morals and lifestyles of the country changed, 
so did the public's view that a teacher's nonconforming 
dress should be considered "immoral." More recent dismissal 
cases are based on charges of neglect of duty and insubordi­
nation. The insubordination charges result solely from the 
teacher's refusal to comply with an order to change his 
appearance. Neglect of duty has been charged in such 
instances where the board feels that the manner in which a 
teacher dresses affects school-community relations. 
A review of the statutes of all fifty states concern­
ing teacher dismissal reveals that twenty-three states list 
insubordination as cause for dismissal, and twenty-nine 
include neglect of duty as grounds for such action. The 
courts must examine individual situations and weigh all evi­
dence in deciding each case. 
92Beale, Are American Teachers Free? p. 381. 
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The majority of cases concerning teacher dress and 
grooming have been heard in the last two decades. With an 
increased interest in individual rights during this period, 
teachers have initiated litigation to ascertain their 
rights. The precarious position of the teacher, in relation 
to exposure to young children, forces the courts to balance 
these individual rights against community interest and the 
state's compelling interest in education. This has contrib­
uted to the illusive and contradictory decisions rendered 
by the courts concerning matters of teacher dress and 
grooming. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TEACHER DRESS AND GROOMING 
Introduction 
As citizens, public school teachers enjoy many of the 
same freedoms guaranteed to all Americans. They have the 
right to speak, think, and associate with groups of their 
own choosing under most circumstances* They may also hold 
office and espouse political philosophies as they desire. 
As public school teachers, however, they are obligated to 
exercise these freedoms with restricted discretion and due 
consideration of their effects upon others, especially 
children. 
By virtue of their positions, teachers perform govern­
ment functions which require that they conform to certain 
laws, rules, and regulations not ordinarily applicable to 
citizens outside the profession. When the regulations and 
restrictions imposed upon them appeared to be unnecessary, 
unreasonable, or in conflict with constitutional guarantees 
and statutory provisions, however, teachers have sought 
legal relief."'" 
^-Edmund C. Bolmier, Schools in the Legal Structure 
(Cincinnati! The W. H. Anderson Company, 1973)# P* 198. 
5* 
Teachers and school boards often disagree as to what 
is reasonable and legal* In many instances* litigation 
arises from such incidents» and the courts must decide the 
reasonableness and legality of the school-board-imposed 
restrictions. It is, therefore, the courts which must make 
the ultimate decision as to the limits to which teacher 
2 
rights extend. 
The courts, in recent years, have been called upon to 
determine the legality of a bewildering array of cases deal­
ing with school board rules prohibiting certain modes of 
dress and grooming by teachers. In most instances the dis­
cussions of teacher "dress" and teacher "grooming" have been 
meshed as one issue, but there is a subtle distinction 
between the two. When teachers get home from school, they 
can change their clothing immediately, but grooming is not 
so easily altered when teachers enter their private lives. 
For this reason, grooming rules have had a more significant 
irapact on a teacher's private life than rules affecting a 
teacher's dress. This distinction is sometimes, but not 
always, emphasized in the resolution of court cases.^ 
The majority of court cases involving teacher dress and 
grooming have been associated, either directly or indirectly, 
2Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
3Thomas J. Flygare, "Teachers* Public Lives and Legal 
Rights," Education Digest 42 (February 1977)*26-2?. 
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with the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
The relevant section of the First Amendment deals with the 
guaranteed freedoms of speech and religion. Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits any governmental 
body from depriving any person of life, liberty, or prop­
erty without due process of law, has also been grounds for 
litigation. Generally, the plaintiffs allege that dress 
and grooming are forms of symbolic speech protected by the 
First Amendment. When public school teachers have worn 
religious garb, they have declared that this is a right to 
freedom of religion also guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
In such cases where dress and grooming have been considered 
liberties, some teachers have initiated litigation on the 
grounds that these liberty interests have been taken away 
without due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In discussing legal issues, it is important to remember 
that each decision of the court relates only to the specific 
issues in that particular case. Some decisions, however, 
do tend to establish legal precedents or "case law" more 
than do others. In rendering decisions, courts often depend 
heavily on rulings made by influential judges in other cases. 
Decisions from a United States Circuit Court of Appeals tend to 
establish precedents more than.do decisions from a Federal District 
Court, while decisions rendered by the United States Supreme 
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Court* binding across the country, establish the greatest 
precedent in regard to a particular issue.1* 
Although a legal precedent may have been established 
concerning an issue, this does not prevent an individual 
from pursuing his grievance in court. A different set of 
facts and circumstances can easily change the outcome of 
the litigation. Consequently, generalizing and drawing 
specific conclusions from legal research is especially 
difficult.5 
The courts, in recent years, have handed down numerous 
decisions concerning constitutional questions relating to 
the dress and grooming of public school teachers. These 
include cases dealing with the denial of freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, and of due process. As a result of 
these court decisions, certain legal principles involving 
teacher dress and grooming have evolved. Established on the 
basis of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, these will be 
enumerated and discussed in this chapter. 
^Alan Abeson, "Litigation," Public Policy and the 
Education of Exceptional Children, ed. Frederick J. 
Weintraub (Preston, Virginia* The Council for Exceptional 
Children, 1976), p. 25^. 
Slbid. 
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Legal Bases for Court Cases Regarding Teacher 
Dress and Grooming 
Overview 
An increasing number of teachers protest against 
requirements made toy school boards which attempt to regu­
late the manner in which they dress and groom themselves. 
They feel that dress and grooming are personal matters, and 
they should be allowed to appear as they like. On the 
other hand, many school boards feel that it is their obli­
gation to insure that a teacher's appearance is in accor­
dance with the standards of the professional community. 
The quest by teachers for liberty to exercise their per­
sonal freedoms received much recognition by the public and 
the courts during the late sixties and early seventies. 
Although courts, in the past, were reluctant to become 
involved in school affairs, they have been willing to inter­
vene in situations where a teacher's constitutional rights 
may have been violated through arbitrary rules and regula­
tions. While the courts have been clear in stating that 
teachers possess constitutional rights, both in and out of 
the schoolhouse, they have also been careful to balance 
these rights against the teacher's responsibility as a 
public employee, and as an exemplar to students. 
If it had not been for the noble efforts made by stu­
dents in advancing their constitutional rights, teachers 
might never have stepped forward to ascertain their freedoms. 
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Several decisions rendered by the courts in relation to 
student dress and grooming were broadened to encompass 
teachers. This opened the litigable door for teachers who 
felt they too deserved constitutional considerations the same 
as students and other public employees did. 
Control of the Schools 
Education, per se, is not a federal matter; it was 
left as one of the powers of the states or to the people by 
the framers of the Constitution. At no point does the Con­
stitution refer expressly to education. Thus, education 
became a state function under the Tenth Amendment which 
provides* 
The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respec­
tively, or to the people.6 
A change in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights, the first ten 
amendments, applicable to the states. This opened up a new 
area for the courts to regulate. Originally, the Bill of 
Rights applied only to the federal government, but in 1925, 
these ten amendments, which guarantee the rights of the indi­
vidual, were absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment and 
were made applicable to the states as well. This then made 
the personal rights expressed in the First Amendment 
^U.S. Const, amend. X, sec. 1. 
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"liberties" protectable by the due process clause in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' 
Prior to the 1950s, the federal courts rarely inter­
vened in educational matters. Because of this lack of 
interest, the states began to develop a body of case law 
which permitted the enactment of state and local educa­
tional policies and practices that failed to meet minimal 
constitutional requirements under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. This set the stage for attracting federal 
court attention toward the schools* regulation of both stu-
Q 
dents and teachers. 
The courts have clearly stated that, while they do not 
wish to intervene in educational matters, they will not 
tolerate violations of constitutional rights. In the case 
of Hobson v. Hanson, heard in 196?, Judge J. Skeliy Wright 
so eloquently stated: 
It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding 
this case, the court must act in an area so alien 
to its expertise. It would be far better indeed 
for those great social and political problems to 
be resolved in the political arena by other 
branches of government. But these are social and 
political problems that defy such resolution. In 
such situations, under our system, the judiciary 
must bear a hand and accept its responsibility 
where constitutional rights hang in the balance.9 
?John C. Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public 
Interest (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 
IsTO-t P. 9. 
®Ibid., p. 5* 
^Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. *K>1 (D.D.C. 196?)• 
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When teachers have defended their dress and grooming 
practices, they have done so on the claims of violations 
of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. While the 
courts are quick to state that teachers are citizens, recog­
nized by the Constitution, they have been slow to remand 
regulations imposed by school boards that are neither arbi­
trary nor unreasonable• 
The courts, feeling that they could not possibly fore­
see all the numerous and perplexing problems that might 
arise in the day-to-day business of running the public 
schools, entrusted to boards of education the authority to 
make such rules and regulations as might be necessary for 
the governing of these public institutions, as long as the 
requirements were reasonable and not discriminatory. In 
the case of State v. Marion County Board of Education, the 
courts further elaborated on this position» 
Boards of Education, rather than the courts, are 
charged with the important and difficult duty of 
operating the public schools. So, it is not a 
question of whether this or that individual judge 
or court considers a given regulation adopted by 
the Board as expedient. The Court's duty, regard­
less of its personal views, is to uphold the Board's 
regulation unless it is generally viewed as being 
arbitrary and unreasonable t any other policy would 
result in confusion detrimental to the progress and 
efficiency of our public school system.10 
'This opinion was supported in the black armband case of 
*®State v. Marion County Board of Education, 202 
Tenn. 29, 3°2 S.W.2d (1957). 
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Tinker v. Pes Moines by Justice Hugo Black, who said that 
the day-to-day operation of the public schools should be 
left up to the "school masters."^ 
As previously stated, the Tenth Amendment to the Consti 
tution relinquishes control of the public schools to the 
states, and the individual states organize their school 
boards. In one recent decision concerning teacher dress, 
the court referred several times to the fact that schools 
are under the control of local boards of education, and 
12 
that these are elected bodies. The appellant's claim 
to free expression, in choice of dress, had to be balanced 
against the board's responsibility to promote respect for 
authority, traditional values, and discipline. The court 
would not substitute its judgment and gave the school 
board the power to decide in the absence of an arbitrary 
act. It was decided in this case that the board did not 
abuse its discretion. The court further stated that 
"public education" implies control by the public, not by 
13 
the teachers. J 
•^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
393 U.S. 503, 89 S.ct. 733. 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 
*%ast Hartford Education Association v. East 
Hartford Board of Education, 562 F.2d 838, 2nd Cir. 
(1977). 
^William J. Ceccolli, "The Courts and Teacher Groom­
ing, Dress Codes," NASSP Bulletin 6k (May 1980)190-91. 
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This decision was even more significant since it 
occurred in the Second Circuit, which has been rather 
liberal in its decisions concerning the rights of teachers* 
Perhaps the most crucial statement made by the court in ren­
dering this decision was its feeling that "the benefit to 
the public by the servant outweighs the impairment of 
individual rights.Labeling this claim of rights "friv­
olous," the court said* "By bringing trivial activities 
under the constitutional umbrella, we trivialize the con­
stitutional provision itself."1-' 
Rights of Teachers as Public Employees 
The history of public education is replete with inci­
dents illustrating that teachers have been restricted 
in their personal, professional, and political rights more often 
than members of other professions. Numerous efforts by 
both professional organizations and individual teachers have 
been made in attempts to help remedy the situation through 
negotiation and litigation. Many of the limitations placed 
upon teachers have resulted from the exemplary nature of 
their profession. Citizens, boards of education, and the 
courts have felt that they are justified in holding teachers 
to higher standards of behavior than others have been 
lifEast Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, p. 860. 
15Ibid. 
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expected to uphold. This expectancy on the part of the 
public has caused many educators to feel that they are 
second-class citizens.^ 
Traditionally, a teaching position was granted as a 
"privilege" on the condition that the range of constitu­
tional rights available to citizens, in general, would not 
be exercised by those who entered the occupation of 
teaching. This historic doctrine of "teaching as a privi­
lege" has been discredited and discarded by the courts. 
They have held that teachers cannot be governed by a 
watered-down version of the Constitution. It is now recog­
nized, through authoritative court holdings, that teachers 
have a "property" interest in their jobs and that such 
interest is protected by a full range of constitutional 
17 
guarantees. 
Because no rights are absolute, however, the civil 
rights of teachers may be legally curtailed in certain cir­
cumstances. The particular status of a teacher is 
unique, and responsibilities may justify the application of 
constitutional principles in ways which some people consider 
to be undue restrictions of civil rights. Teachers often 
have been included in the same category as governmental 
"*"^Louis Fischer, "The Rights of Teachers in Post-Indus-
trial Society," Education Digest hZ (February 1977)»383* 
17Ibid. 
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workers and the armed services, in that they have had limita-
18 
tions placed upon them because of their unique status. 
An early court decision, while not directly related 
to teachers, helped to establish guidelines under which 
public employees could be controlled. In the case of 
Baglev v. Washington Township Hospital District, the 
Supreme Court defined the limits of public restrictions 
upon political activities of public employees, another 
First Amendment right.^ The Court established that, in 
order to waive constitutional rights as a condition of 
public employment, the employer must demonstrate (1) that 
the political restraints rationally relate to the enhance­
ment of the public service, (2) that the benefits which 
the public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting 
impairment of constitutional rights, and (3) that no alter­
natives less subversive of constitutional rights are avail­
able. The ruling made in Finot v. Pasadena City Board of 
Education (1967), involving a bearded teacher, referred to 
these guidelines in remanding a school board's regulation 
20 
against the wearing of beards. 
18Ibid. 
10 
7Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District, 
955 Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (1963). 
2°Finot v. Pasadena Board of Education, 250 Cal. App. 2d 
I89t 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).  
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In the landmark court case of Pickering v. Board of 
Education (1968), which involved the right to freedom of 
speech for teachers, the Supreme Court noted that state 
employment may not be conditioned on the relinquishment of 
First Amendment rights.2* The Court stated that, 
at the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the 
state has interests as an employer in regulating 
the speech of its employees that differ from 
those it possesses in connection with regulation 
of the speech of the citizenry in general.22 
More recently, the courts have sustained comprehensive and 
substantial restrictions upon activities of both federal 
23 
and state employees. J 
In the majority of cases in which the federal courts 
have upheld dismissals in the face of constitutional chal­
lenges, the public employer has presented evidence of a 
compelling interest in enforcing the dress and grooming regu 
lations in question. In Stradlev v. Anderson (1973)» for 
example, the city offered evidence that beards and long hair 
might interfere with the proper wearing of a fireman's 
oxygen mask.2^ In cases upholding a city or state's right 
to regulate the appearance of policemen or firemen, the 
^-Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
22Ibid. 
23see CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)1 
See also Broadwick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)* 
2^Stradley v. Anderson, 478 P.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973)* 
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courts have recognized the need for establishing discipline 
and maintaining the public's confidence in employees work­
ing in such sensitive and highly visible roles. In other 
cases, however, the courts have felt that teachers, working 
in public institutions, simply do not have the public expo­
sure which policemen and other public employees have, 
dealing as they do, directly with the public.2^ 
The United States Supreme Court, in Kellev v. Johnson 
(1976), ruled on the constitutionality of grooming regula-
tions applicable to male police officers. Directed at 
style and length of hair, sideburns, and mustaches, beards 
and goatees being prohibited except for medical purposes, 
the Court ruled that under certain specified instances, the 
State could make and enforce restrictive grooming codes. The 
test used in determining the legality of such regulations 
answered the question of whether the individual could demon­
strate that there was no rational connection between the 
regulations and the promotion of safety of persons and 
property. In addressing the county police department's 
decision to adopt a dress code, the Court maintained that: 
this choice may be based on a desire to make 
police officers readily recognizable to the 
members of the public, or a desire for the 
2^Handler v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 
273C.A. Tex. (1975). 
26Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
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esprit de corps which such similarity is felt 
to inculcate within the police force itself.27 
The Court held that either purpose was a sufficient rational 
justification for regulations. This, in effect, defeated 
the policeman's claim based on the liberty guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court cautioned those wishing to make a sweeping 
generalization from this decision, warning that the regula­
tion should not be viewed in isolation, but in the context 
of the county's chosen mode of organization for its police 
force. 
When the state has an interest in regulating 
one's personal appearance . . . there must be 
a weighing of the degree of infringement of the 
individual's liberty interest against the need 
for regulation.2® 
Kellev determines that the right of public employees 
to dress and groom as they please is not "fundamental" in 
the constitutional sense. Accordingly, the state carries 
no burden of justification in this case.29 
The full impact of the Kellev decision on school dis­
tricts is unknown. The Circuit Court in Tardif v. Quinn 
(1976) relied, in part, on Kellev in sustaining a board's 
dismissal of a teacher for reason of dress length.-^0 It 
would appear that a board may adopt reasonable grooming 
27Ibid., p. 256. 28Ibid. 29Ibid. 
30Tardif v. Quinn, 5^5 F»2d 761 (1st Cir. 1976). 
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codes which are applied equitably and which can be defended 
on the basis of some educationally sound rationale. 
Whatever constitutional aspect there may be to 
one's choice of apparel, generally it is hardly 
a matter which falls totally beyond the scope 
of the demands which an employer, public or pri­
vate, can legitimately make upon its employees.31 
Some courts have argued that teachers are established 
in exemplary roles in the community and must adhere to 
reasonable dress codes. In the more recent case of East 
Hartford Education Association v. Board of Education (1977), 
the Kellev principles were the foundation for the court's 
decision.^2 The court, in this case, upheld as reasonable 
the school board's requirement that men wear neckties. The 
Second Circuit Court said that, although there are differ­
ences between the functions of policemen and teachers, the 
same constitutional test applies. Noting the presumption 
of constitutionality for legislative (school board) acts, 
the court found that the teacher had not carried his burden 
of demonstrating that the school board's dress code was "so 
irrational that it may be branded as 'arbitrary.'"33 
31Ibid. 
32East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, p. 863. 
33ibid. 
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Parallel Development of Student and Teacher Rights 
Certain parallel developments have occurred in recent 
years that have aided in expanding the areas of student 
and teacher rights under the First and Fourteenth Amend­
ments. These developments have come about as a result of 
attempted regulation by school authorities of dress and 
grooming of both students and teachers. Because of a long 
period of laissez-faire and apparent lack of interest of 
state and federal judges in school matters, a body of law 
had developed at the state level which permitted school 
authorities to make rules and regulations governing student 
and teacher conduct, but which failed, in many instances, 
to meet minimal constitutional requirements. Much of the 
recent court activity in this area, therefore, has been 
initiated to correct these inequities. Courts have been 
asked to review the constitutionality of such school rules 
and practices on the grounds that they were in violation 
either of the First Amendment "freedom of expression" or of 
personal "liberties" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
. 3^ ment.^ 
The analytical tools used have been the "standard of 
review" and the establishment of who carried the "burden of 
proof." Formerly, it was the responsibility of the party 
attacking the statute, educational practice, or school rule 
3^ogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public 
Interest, p. 79. 
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to carry the burden of proving that the intrusion by the 
state was not for the purpose of the legitimate state 
interest. This has now evolved into a different level of 
scrutiny which sheds new light on First Amendment rights. 
In cases involving dress and grooming as a liberty interest, 
the burden now rests on school authorities to justify regula­
tion of that liberty.35 
The classical view of the courts on student and teacher 
rights was set forth in the landmark Arkansas case in 1923 
of Pugslev v. Sellmeyer.-^ The case involved a challenge 
by a female student of a school regulation that stated* "The 
wearing of transparent hosiery, low-necked dresses, or any 
style of clothing tending toward immodesty in dress, the use 
of face-paint or cosmetics is prohibited."37 The school 
board viewed Miss Pugsley's defiance of the rule as a chal­
lenge to its authority and denied her admission to the 
school. 
In ruling on this case, the Arkansas Supreme Court held 
that the rule was "reasonable" and that the school board had 
the right to make and enforce it. They further stated that 
the management of the public schools is vested in local 
boards, which have broad discretionary powers.3® 
35ibid. 
36Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 2^7 (1923). 
3?Ibid., pp. 251-252. 38ibid. 
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The court was most forceful in stating that it would 
not interfere with regulations adopted by school boards 
and would not consider the expediency and wisdom of such 
regulations. In addition, they would accept for delibera­
tion only those questions dealing with the reasonable 
exercise of the power and discretion of the board. The 
point was made, also, that the courts had more important 
duties to perform than to attend to the everyday management 
of the schools, and that the business of education should 
be left to the educators.39 
The guidelines established in this case became known 
as the "Pugsley Principles."^0 
1. Education is a state matter: courts will not 
normally interfere in the management of the 
schools. 
2. The state has delegated authority over the 
schools to local boards, and the actions, 
therefore, in general are immune to court 
scrutiny unless such boards fail to per­
form a clear duty or unless they act 
unreasonably. 
3. Reasonableness—not the wisdom or expediency— 
of school rules would usually discourage 
review by a state court. (The educational 
wisdom that called forth the rule in the 
first instance was presumed.) 
4. Courts have more important functions to per­
form than to hear schoolboys' complaints 
about the government of their schools. 
39ibid. 
^°Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public 
Interest, p. 82. 
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5< Obedience (to submit to or obey the rules) 
and respect for constituted authority are 
appropriate lessons for teaching good citi­
zenship in the classroom. 
6. The measures of "unreasonableness" include* 
student oppression or humiliation! consump­
tion of time or expenditure of money* imposi­
tion of an unusual affirmative dutyj and 
medical reasons* 
7* The "burden of proof" is on the party (stu­
dent) challenging the rule. A valid reason 
for annulling a school rule must be shown 
by the student attacking the rule, while no 
valid reason at all need be shown by the 
school board for the rule's promulgation in 
the first instance for its validation by 
the courts.^1 
This case solidly established the courts* feeling in 
dealing with the issues of dress and grooming. It may very 
well have been a deterrent to further litigation of these 
issues during this time period, for court cases involving 
teacher appearance during this era were virtually non­
existent. Teachers vigorously prescribed to standards of 
dress and grooming established by the community and were 
aware that to venture beyond those was to jeopardize 
their positions. 
Around 1950, the federal courts, and particularly the 
Supreme Court, began to realize that many educational poli­
cies and practices, which had developed under state laws 
and through state court decisions, were not in conformity 
with federal constitutional requirements. Thus federal 
^Ibid. 
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attorneys initiated action, entering the educational arena 
to untangle constitutional issues. 
The decades of the sixties and seventies brought with 
them a movement toward recognition of the rights of the 
individual. Students were among the first, through court 
action, to demand that their rights be recognized. Simul­
taneously, with all the "pupil appearance" cases, a number 
of cases were adjudicated which involved the dress and 
grooming of teachers. The teachers did, in a sense, ride 
in on the coattails of the students in their demands for 
civil rights. 
Although allegations abound that the appearance of the 
teacher has a definite effect on student dress by way of 
example and, in turn, has a definite correlation with stu­
dent behavior, the courts appear to be more lenient toward 
teachers than toward pupils in matters regarding dress and 
Lo 
grooming. 
Whereas the courts, in 1923, apparently thought that 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments were not applicable to 
a school rule that prohibited a girl from wearing talcum 
powder on her face, times had changed. Until 1969, the 
courts almost unanimously adopted the concept of "reasonable­
ness" established in the Pueslev case as a standard for 
measuring the constitutionality of an educational practice 
or a school rule. 
^2Bolmeier, Schools in the Legal Structure, p. 198. 
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The year 1969, however, ushered in a new era in stu­
dent-teacher rights which made it clear that the constitu­
tional rights of students and teachers, whether on the 
campus or elsewhere, are subject to a different level of 
scrutiny. The decision which was instrumental in changing 
the attitude of the courts toward issues involving student 
and teacher rights was Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent 
School District (1969)«^ This case involved students acting 
in a passive, orderly manner, who were suspended for wear­
ing black armbands to protest the government's Vietnam 
policy. Justice Abraham Fortas, who wrote the majority 
opinion, concluded that their conduct came under the pro­
tection of the Constitution in the free speech clause of 
the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Four­
teenth. 
This case clearly established that both teachers and 
students have constitutional rights which shall be recog­
nized both in and out of the school environment, as long as 
their actions do not materially or substantially disrupt 
the educational process. The burden of proof, which, in 
Pugslev. was carried by the student attacking the "reason­
ableness" of the school rule, thus has been shifted, in 
Tinker, to the school authorities, who now must justify 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733. 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 
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their actions by showing that the prohibitions they impose 
on freedom of expression are necessary to deter conduct 
which interferes materially and substantially with school 
44 
operations* 
A grooming case decision* originally established for 
students, was broadened to encompass teachers in Conard v. 
Goolsby.**^ The court, in this case, cited the principles 
established in Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College with regard 
to male college students and grooming codesThe court 
maintained that a fitting boundary line for determining 
when a public institution can no longer enforce regulations 
of a student's liberty lies between high school and colleges 
The state has no total rights to regulate hair 
styles—today the court affirms that the adult's 
constitutional right to wear his hair as he 
chooses supersedes the state's right to intrude. ' 
In citing the principles established in Conard. the 
court held that the teacher, as an adult and as a citizen, 
had a right to appear as he pleased, within reason. 
Although the court did not clearly establish whether the 
an* The Schools, the Courts, and the Public Inter-
est, pp. 83-84. 
^^Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Miss. 1972). 
^Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 
(5th Cir. 1972). 
^Ibid., pp. 662-663* 
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right was fundamental in nature, it did question the power 
llQ 
of the state to regulate in this area. 
It was the court's view, in this case, that the state 
had no right to interfere in an employee's appearance when 
it was not related to his ability to perform in his work. 
In effect, it transferred the initial burden of proof from 
the teacher to the board. A key factor in the court's 
decision was a lack of proof that the teacher's appearance 
inhibited the students' ability to learn.^ 
It is interesting to note that the number of cases 
heard on student dress and grooming far surpasses those 
which deal with teachers. Much of this is due to the fact 
that a teacher, being a public employee, is under unique 
circumstances unlike those of the student. A teacher is 
paid to go to school, and a student is not. 
Many of the rights gained by teachers have been estab­
lished only since students gained them. The courts have found 
it difficult to deny teachers the same rights that they 
have guaranteed to students. 
^Conard v. Goolsby, pp. 718-719. 
^9ibid. 
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Teacher Dress and Grooming Related 
to the first Amendment 
Overview 
The First Amendment was designed to protect certain 
basic personal freedoms or civil rights. Two segments have 
been governing factors in court proceedings involving the 
legality of controlling a teacher's dress and grooming. 
The relevant portions statei 
Congress shall make no law respecting establish­
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or 
of the press ... .30 
The oldest issue involving teacher dress revolves 
around the right of public school employees to wear 
religious garb while instructing. Teachers who wish to wear 
such garb feel that this is a freedom guaranteed them by 
the First Amendment. Those opposing this practice feel 
that this enhances a sectarian environment in the public 
schools. There has been much litigation involving this 
issue, and the legislatures enjoy a wide range of discre­
tion concerning this question. 
The "freedom of speech" provision has become litigable 
grounds in preventing regulation of a teacher's dress and 
grooming. Some courts have classified "dress" and 
"grooming" as forms of "symbolic speech," entitled to the 
same constitutional protection as "pure speech." When 
50u.S. Const, amend. I, sec. 1. 
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symbolic speech is very close to pure speech, the First 
Amendment protection is high. The courts, however, have 
been more lenient in recognizing grooming as "symbolic 
speech" than they have in recognizing dress. This is 
because a teacher may change his or her dress after school, 
but grooming is a more permanent aspect of one's appear­
ance and personal expression. 
Dress as Religious Freedom 
The controversy surrounding the right of public school 
authorities to forbid the wearing of distinctive religious 
garb by public school teachers has been questioned for 
over three-quarters of a century. The controversy usually 
reaches the courtroom when an attempt is made to restrain 
the board from hiring nuns to teach in the public schools, 
if they expect to wear their distinctive garb. 
Opponents of the practice argue that the employment of nuns 
who wear religious garb constitutes the use of public school 
funds for sectarian instruction. The reply of the teachers 
is that to deny them this privilege is to deny them religious 
freedom guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment. This is answered by the contention that opposi­
tion is not targeted to the individual religious beliefs 
of the teachers, but to the wearing of clothes unique to a 
particular order of a particular church.^ 
S^Reutter and Hamilton, The Law of Public Education 
p. 18. 
79 
It can scarcely be denied that such distinctive garb 
tends to create a religious environment in the classroom. 
In view of the fact that the garb serves as a constant 
reminder of the teacher's religious affiliation, and that 
children develop impressions just as much from what they 
see as from what they hear, it would not be difficult to 
conclude that the wearing of religious garb constitutes 
sectarian influence. While such influence may fall short 
of sectarian "teaching," it would appear to have a "propa­
gandizing effect," especially when the garb includes 
religious insignia. Thus, the practice of wearing religious 
garb in the public schools might be recognized as an uncon-
<2 
stitutional advancement of religion. 
The opposing argument, that the wearing of religious 
garb is protected by the "free exercise" clause, can be 
answered in two ways. First, the religious liberty of one 
person may not be exercised so as to limit the freedom of 
others. Secondly, a prohibition against religious garb in 
the public schools does not in any way interfere with a 
teacher's freedom of belief; it only means that, during the 
time in which the teacher is employed as an agent of the 
state, she cannot engage in a practice which constitutes sectarian 
influence.^ 
^2Williard R. Hazard, Education and the Law (New York» 
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 61-62. 
53lbid. 
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An early court decision that did not deal directly 
with this issue further substantiates this view. In the 
case.of Reynolds v. United States (1878), the court refused 
to allow a religious belief as a defense against a polygamy 
prosecution.^ Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Morrison 
Waite stated* "Laws are made for the government of actions, 
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs 
and opinions, they may with practices."^ 
In instances where specific dress of particular sects, 
such as Quakers, Amish, Dunkards, Catholic religious orders, 
and other clergymen, has been considered commonplace, the 
courts have upheld the right of the individual to wear a 
particular garb. In the case of Hvsong v. Gallitzen Borough 
School District, decided in Pennsylvania in 1894, the court 
agreed that such manner of dress conveyed to students the 
idea of membership in a sect.^ The court, nevertheless, 
pointed out that the religious belief of such teachers was 
well known throughout the community even without their wear­
ing a special type of dress and upheld the right of such 
teachers to be employed by the public schools. The court, 
however, did suggest that the legislature might, by statute, 
^Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (I878). 
^Ibid., p. 166. 
•5%ysong v. Gallitzen Borough School District, 164 Pa. 
629, 30 A. 482 (1894). 
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require the teachers in the public.schools to wear a par­
ticular style of dress and prohibit all others. 
The Pennsylvania lawmaking body took the advice ren­
dered by the court and enacted a statute in 1895 that pre­
vented any teacher in the public schools from wearing any 
dress, insignia, marks, or emblems indicating the fact that 
such teacher was an adherent or member of any religious 
order, sect, or denomination. This was followed by a court 
decision which judged the statute valid and which commented 
that the prohibition was directed against the actions, not 
the beliefs, of a teacher while in the performance of his 
or her duties.The Supreme Court of the state held that 
the statute did not unconstitutionally prescribe a religious 
test for public school teachers, but was merely a valid 
exercise of the legislature's power to regulate the adminis­
tration of the state schools. The statute's declared pur­
pose, that it was "important that all appearances of sec­
tarianism should be avoided in the administration of the 
public schools of this commonwealth," was a valid legisla­
tive object. 
In the absence of specific statutes, it appears to be 
the law in most states that the mere wearing of religious 
^Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910). 
58ibid., p. 68. 
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garb by an otherwise qualified and competent teacher does 
not violate federal or state constitutional rights concern­
ing sectarian influence. A New York case, decided in 1906, 
was suggestive in stating that the mere wearing of a 
religious costume of a religious sect brings into the school 
"sectarian influence" inconsistent with the state's consti­
tutionally declared policy against sectarianism.59 The 
court held that a regulation of the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, that prohibited the wearing of religious 
garb by teachers, was a reasonable and valid exercise of 
the powers conferred on him. It must be realized, the 
court said, that: 
Some control over the habiliments of teachers is 
essential to the proper conduct of public schools, 
thus, vagaries in costume could not be permitted 
without being destructive of good order and disci­
pline. So, also, it would be manifestly proper 
to prohibit the wearing of badges calculated on 
particular occasions to constitute cause of offense 
to a considerable number of pupils as, for example, 
the display of orange ribbons in a public school 
in a Roman Catholic community on the 12th of 
J u l y  . . . .  6 0  
The court further declared that the effect of the costume 
worn was to inspire respect and sympathy for the religious 
denomination to which the wearer belonged. To this extent, 
the influence was judged to be sectarian. 
59o'Connor v. Hedrick, 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612 
(1906). 
6oIbid., p. 615. 
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A North Dakota case, in the absence of legislative 
policy on the subject, upheld the right of an individual to 
wear religious garb. Litigation was brought by four quali­
fied teachers in a consolidated school system to secure 
approval to wear the particular dress of a religious order. 
In upholding the right of teaching nuns to wear their 
religious habits while teaching, the court saidt 
We are all agreed that the wearing of the reli­
gious habit o . . does not convert the school 
into a sectarian school, or create sectarian 
control within the purview of the Constitution. 
Such habit, it is true, proclaimed that the 
wearers were members of a certain denominational 
organization, but so would the wearing of the 
emblem of the Christian Endeavor Society or the 
Epworth League. The laws of the state do not 
prescribe the fashion of dress of the teachers 
i n  o u r  s c h o o l s  . . . .  6 1  
One court has disqualified sill nuns from teaching in 
the public schools, apparently on the grounds that their 
lives are dedicated to the teaching of religion. In the 
case of Harfst v. Hoegen (1972), the court recognized the 
absolute separation of church and state, not only in govern-
6 2 
mental matters, but also in educational ones as well. c This 
was one of many cases that involved the incorporation of a 
parochial school into the public school system. The court 
not only disqualified the members involved in this litiga­
tion, but included also even those who had not yet taught 
in the public schools. 
6lGerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. W, 267 N.W. 127 (1936). 
62Harfst v. Hoegen, 3^9 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (19^2). 
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A court case with a different flavor concerned the 
city of New Haven which sought to recover from the defen­
dant town, Torrington, expenses incurred in the education 
of children which the plaintiff claimed were properly 
chargeable to the defendant under the provisions of the 
general statutes.^ The defendant appealed, claiming no 
liability on the grounds that the school in which the 
children were educated was not a public school. The court 
stated as criteria that a school, to be a public school, 
must (l) be under public control and (2) be free from sec­
tarian instruction. In deciding for the town of Torrington, 
the court felt that the atmosphere implicit in the daily 
school routine, the physical surroundings, and the religious 
garb worn by the instructors, all contributed to the sec­
tarian environment of the school. 
The view that a nun may not be excluded from employment 
as a teacher in the public schools was espoused by the 
American Civil Liberties Union in a New Mexico case.^ The 
plaintiffs, in this case, sought to have all members of 
Catholic religious orders declared ineligible and forever 
barred from teaching in the public schools. The basis for 
this demand was the assertion that the oath taken by nuns on 
joining a religious order, coupled with the doctrinal 
^3city of New Haven v. Town of Torrington, 132 Conn. 
194, 43 A.2d 455 (1945). 
64Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951). 
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teachings of the Catholic Church regarding education, would 
make it impossible for a nun conscientiously and completely 
to perform the duties of her office. The Civil Liberties 
Union, which took the same position with respect to public 
school teachers who were members of the Communist Party, 
felt that the right to hold public employment must be judged 
exclusively by acts and not by beliefs. If, however, the 
teacher were shown to have abused her position by indoctri­
nating her pupils in her own sectarian beliefs, the Union 
felt that this justified disciplinary action or even dis­
missal. On the other hand, to disqualify a teacher in 
advance would be to punish her for thoughts and beliefs, 
thus violating the whole spirit of the First Amendment. 
The court, nevertheless, upheld the regulation adopted by 
the State Board of Education barring the wearing of reli­
gious garb by public school teachers. 
In 1952 a lower court in Missouri held that the dog­
matic educational teachings of the Catholic Church, the 
duties of Catholic teachers within, as well as outside, 
the public school system coupled with the oath of disci­
pline taken by nuns, disqualified them from employment as 
public school teachers. The case of Berghorn v. Reorganized 
School District (1953) involved two teaching orders of nuns, 
one of which was involved in the previous Harfst case. 
^%erghorn v. Reorganized School District No. 8, 
36^ Mo. 121 (1953)• 
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The court quoted the law of the Third Plenary Council of 
Baltimore, a pastoral letter of the hierarchy, and the 
sections of the Canon Law dealing with the duties of 
members of religious orders and with education. On the basis 
of these teachings, the court found that these religious 
personnel may not be lawfully employed as teachers in any 
free public schools. 
A change in judicial thinking occurred with the deci­
sion written in the most recent case heard on this subject, 
Rawlings v. Butler (1956). This involved action to enjoin 
school officials from spending public and school funds to 
compensate teachers who were members of a religious soci­
ety. ̂  The Circuit Court of Appeals denied and dismissed the 
action whereupon the plaintiffs appealed. The court held 
that employment of members of religious orders to 
teach in public schools who wore religious garb or 
emblems did not, of itself, violate constitutional guar-
67 
antees of freedom of religion. 
Dress as Symbolic Speech 
One of the claims most often voiced by teachers in 
defense of their style of dress is that it denotes a kind 
of "symbolic speech," protected by the First Amendment to 
66Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 Ky. (1956). 
6?Ibid., p. 813. 
87 
the Constitution. The Constitution traditionally went only 
as far as to protect "pure" speech, but the famous landmark 
case of Tinker v. Pes Moines (19&9) went one step further 
in including certain nonverbal expressions as a part of the 
protection.^® This case involved the suspension of public 
school pupils for wearing black armbands to protest the 
government's Vietnam policy. Justice Abe Fortas, in deciding 
the case, felt that the students* conduct was within the 
protection of the free speech clause of the First Amendment. 
He also found the wearing of armbands closely akin to "pure 
speech," which is entitled to comprehensive protection under 
the First Amendment. One statement included in his opinion 
has been crucial in establishing the rights of students and 
teachers. 
It can hardly be argued that either students 
or teachers shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate."9 
This became an open invitation to both students and teachers 
to enter the litigable arena in establishing their rights. 
Following the tradition established by Tinker, the 
197^ case of James v. Board of Education was decided in 
favor of the teacher in much the same way that Tinker had 
°°Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
p• 506. 
69Ibid. 
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decided for the students.?0 In this case it was held that 
school officials, in discharging a teacher* violated his 
constitutional rights because he wore a black armband to 
school as a symbolic protest against the Vietnam War. The 
court held that the wearing of a black armband, as in 
Tinker, was a First Amendment right akin to "pure speech."?* 
Although the wearing of armbands was ruled permissible, 
the courts are more likely to uphold a school's dress code 
prohibiting the wearing of certain clothing. A case, decided 
in 1969 by the Louisiana Court of Appeals, dealt with a 
school-board-adopted rule requiring all male teachers to 
wear neckties.?2 The plaintiff in this case was suspended 
pending his compliance with the rule, whereupon he filed 
suit asserting that the necktie rule was unrelated to any 
legitimate educational objective, and that it violated his 
constitutional right to dress as he pleased. In effect, 
the plaintiff claimed that his clothing was a form of sym­
bolic expression. The court found that such a rule did not 
reasonably restrict such expression and held that the neck­
tie requirement was valid. 
7°James v. Board of Education of Central District No. 1, 
385 P. Supp. 209 D.C.N.Y. (197*0. 
7xIbid., p. 215. 
72Blanchet v. Vermilion Parish School Board, 220, 
So. 2d 53^ (1969). 
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In the more recent case of East Hartford Education 
Association v. Board of Education (1977), the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals conducted an extensive examination of this 
issue.This case involved a dress code written by the 
board of education that required male teachers to wear a 
jacket, shirt, and tie during classroom activities. The 
plaintiff, Mr. Brimley, was required to wear a tie while 
teaching English, but not while teaching filmmaking. He 
refused to wear a tie to teach the English class and was 
reprimanded. He and his union sued in federal district 
court, seeking both a declaratory judgment that the dress 
code was unconstitutional and an injunction against its 
enforcement. Mr. Brimley claimed, in part, that by refusing 
to wear a necktie, he made a statement on current affairs 
that aided him in speaking. In other words, he felt that 
wearing a tie was "symbolic speech" protected by the First 
Amendment. 
This claim required the court to balance the teacher's 
alleged interest in free expression against the school 
board's goals in requiring its teachers to dress more formally 
than they would otherwise choose. First, the court pointed 
out that symbolic speech is not pure speech; rather, it is 
mixed with conduct and is not afforded the same protection 
?3East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, p. 864. 
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as pure speech.^ The court further noted that, as the 
action or thing being controlled becomes less like pure 
speech and more like conduct, the governmental interest 
that must be shown to justify restricting it is progressively 
loosened. In cases where symbolic speech is very close to 
pure speech, such as in Tinker v. Pes Moines (black arm­
bands worn to protest the Vietnam War) and in Russo v. 
Central School District (teachers refusing to recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance), protection under the First Amendment 
is substantial.^ The judge in the Hartford case, however, 
found the speech to be vague and unfocused and close to 
the "speech-conduct" continuum. It was established by the 
court that Brimley had more effective ways of expressing his 
social views to his students. This fact reduced the burden 
of proof that the school board was required to meet in justi­
fying regulation of his dress. In the conclusion of the 
discussion relevant to the First Amendment, the court stated 
that Brimley*s speech claim was "so unsubstantial as to 
border on the frivolous."^ 
?^See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U*S. 536 (1965)• 
^Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733. 
21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)* See also Russo v. Central School 
District, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 411 
U.S. 932 (1973). 
^East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, p. 860. 
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Although the impact of this court decision is yet to be 
determined, it is certain to establish new precedents in 
court cases dealing with teachers* First Amendment rights. 
Grooming as Symbolic Speech 
Claims have been made by teachers that their personal 
grooming practices are a form of their symbolic expression 
and thus are protected by the First Amendment. Some courts 
have agreed with this rationale as long as this grooming has 
not interfered with the educational process or has not 
created a health hazard. Other courts have considered beards 
and mustaches to be simply personal preferences not suf­
ficiently important to merit constitutional protection, and 
they have upheld school regulations controlling grooming 
unless they were clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. 
In a leading case in the area of grooming, Finot v. 
Pasadena Citv Board of Education (196?) i "the California 
Supreme Court dealt with a teacher's refusal to shave his 
beard after having been requested to do so by the school's 
principal.Finot arrived at school wearing a recently 
grown beard, and the principal asked him to shave it off. 
Upon his refusal to do so, the board of education trans­
ferred Finot to home teaching, despite the fact that he was 
a challenging and effective classroom teacher. Finot 
^^Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 
pp. 520-529. 
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branded his transfer "unconstitutional" and went to court 
to force the board to change its action. 
After hearing arguments from lawyers for both sides, 
the trial judge found the board's action in changing Finot*s 
teaching assignment to be a lawful and reasonable exercise 
of discretion. Both Finot and the American Civil Liberties 
Union disagreed and took the case to the U.S. District 
Court in California which supported Finot*s argument. The 
court suggested that a beard may be considered an element 
of symbolic expression and, accordingly, must be given at 
78 
least peripheral constitutional protection. 
The court also found that, although the rule against 
beards may be somewhat related to educational objectives, 
the burden on Finot*s freedom of speech was greater than 
the benefits to the public. If the school board wanted to 
prevent students from wearing beards, it could accomplish 
this goal with less drastic alternatives than requiring 
Finot to shave.^ 
In Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval 
County. Florida (1969), the court held that a school board 
could not constitutionally deny reappointment of a black 
teacher for refusal to shave off his goatee.®0 No written 
78Ibid. 79it,id. 
®°Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval 
County, Florida, 303 F. Supp. 958 (1969)* 
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rule or established policy existed within the school dis­
trict as to the discretion conferred on each principal 
relative to personal appearance. Also, there was no evi­
dence that the wearing of the goatee by the teacher might 
cause disruption to the educational process. This case 
involved a dimension that had not existed in previously 
cited cases. Not only did the court find that the insistence 
upon removal of the goatee was "arbitrary, unreasonable and 
based on personal preference," but it also characterized 
the goatee as a symbol of racial pride and therefore pro-
81 
tected by the First Amendment. 
A case that was found to be in direct contrast to the 
decision in Braxton was Ramsey v. Hopkins, decided one year 
ft 7 
later. c A District Court in Alabama felt that the wearing 
of a mustache by a member of the Negro race was not appropri­
ate as a cultural symbol and therefore found no abridgement 
of First Amendment rights. The court, in this case, struck 
down the regulation opposing the wearing of beards. It did 
state, however, that the plaintiff had failed to meet his 
burden of proof in declaring First Amendment protection. 
8lIbid. 
®2Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. b?7 N.D. Ala. (1970). 
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Teacher Dress and Grooming Related to 
the Fourteenth Amendment 
Overview 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States prohibits any state or governmental 
creation from depriving any individual of life, liberty, 
or property without the benefit of due process of law. 
This amendment is now interpreted to mean that personal 
rights, such as the right to have long hair or short skirts, 
are protected rights in the category of liberty. Property 
is interpreted as including intangibles, such as public ser­
vices, jobs, and public education. 
Another major basis for challenging appearance regula­
tions is the deprivation of a teacher's "liberty" interest 
in the freedom to choose his or her own style of dress and 
grooming. Assuming one has a fundamental right to appear as 
he wishes, within reason, the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
one from infringement upon that right without procedural due 
process. 
Even if dress and grooming have not been established as 
constitutional rights, school officials cannot dismiss' 
teachers on these grounds unless clear written rules have 
been published and communicated to teachers and are applied 
with reasonable due process. 
While the state takes an interest in the actions of the 
public in general, it has a particular interest in the 
95 
conduct of its public employees. "Liberties," then, are 
treated differently in relationship to these two groups. 
Teachers, as public servants in unique positions of trust, 
can be subjected to many restrictions in their professional 
lives. The task of the court, therefore, is to weigh the 
evidence presented in each case to determine which legal 
ingredients apply. If it is established that the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of the teacher have been violated, the 
burden of proof is then on the school board to demonstrate 
a rational necessity or desirability for such a rule. If 
the evidence indicates that the board has, within its implied 
powers, the right to enforce the regulation, the burden of 
proof shifts to the teacher to show that the regulation is 
arbitrary, or that it has been enforced discriminatorily. 
The Liberty or Privacy Interest 
in Personal Appearance 
The constitutional basis used in a majority of cases 
challenging a school board's dress and grooming policies is 
the "liberty interest" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Teacher plaintiffs have argued that enforcement of such codes 
deprives them of the freedom to choose their own styles of 
dress and grooming. The right to dress and groom as one 
pleases can best be considered as an aspect of personal 
liberty analogous to a privacy right. 
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Because the element of self-expression is visibly 
stated through appearance, one's styles of dress and grooming 
become more important to the individual as he moves about 
in public than they do in the confines of his own home. 
This right bears some resemblance to the right of personal 
autonomy first recognized in the case of Roe v. Wade (1973)» 
which determined whether a woman has the right to choose to 
have an abortion. 
The connection between personal appearance cases and 
those dealing with abortion rests on the notion, present in 
each case, of control over one's body. The Supreme Court 
played down this aspect in Roe, at least in terms of privacy, 
but there is little doubt as to its opinion that an individual 
feels a strong and legitimate interest in his person, and 
that the state must have a good reason to interfere with 
it.8* 
The right of privacy was established in the landmark 
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)» in which the 
Court held that "privacy** protected a married couple's deci­
sion to use contraceptives.®-* This case marked an important 
turning point in a renaissance of protection for unenumerated 
83Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
®^"0n Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal 
Liberty," New York University Law Review 670 (October 1973» 
760-770. " 
®^Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)* 
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rights. This intrusion into the personal rights of citi­
zens prompted the Court to find for the right to privacy 
that could not be infringed upon by the government without 
substantial justification. 
The Finot court turned to Griswold in determining the 
degree of protection to which one's personal liberty, such 
86 
as wearing a beard, is entitled. Griswold had considered 
the private, personal liberties established in the cases of 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holv Names of Jesus and 
Marv (1925), and in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), which allowed 
parents to educate their children as they saw fit.®'' The 
court concluded that the right to wear a beard was entitled 
to constitutional protection in light of these cases. 
A similar decision was rendered on this basis in the 
88 
case of Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction. The 
Braxton court, in recalling, from Finot. the "liberty" 
interest established in wearing a beard, stated that "the 
wearer of a goatee here involved deserves no less protec­
tion."89 
®^Finot v. Pasadena Board of Education, 250 Cal. App. 
2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). 
^Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names of Jesus 
and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571# 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); 
See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, ̂ 3 S.Ct. 625» 
67 L.Ed. 10&2 (1923). 
88 
Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval 
County, Florida, p. 959. 
"ibid., p. 959. 
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Although many courts, when faced with dress and groom­
ing questions, have considered Griswold relevant to their 
inquiries, the right to appear as one pleases has been 
treated as a right of privacy by very few of them. The 
trend established by the courts in viewing dress and groom­
ing as a constitutionally protected "liberty" was short­
lived and began to change after the Braxton case. 
Recent court decisions suggest that the Fourteenth 
Amendment may have been stripped of encompassing 
the liberty interest in dress, shaved of guarantee­
ing a protected right to face hair, and trimmed 
neatly of guaranteeing a protected interest in 
hair style. 
Illustrative of this change in court thinking is the 
Blanchet case, involving a suit questioning a regulation 
requiring teachers to wear neckties.91 The plaintiff 
pleaded that the regulation deprived him of his personal 
liberty to dress in accordance with the mode of the com­
munity. He pointed out the personal liberties protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment which include rights of a private 
and individual nature, such as the right to marry whom one 
wishes, the right to travel, the right to educate children 
as parents wish, and the right to wear clothes as one 
chooses. The court, nevertheless, held that the regulation 
was not so unreasonable as to go beyond the school board's 
90M. A. McGhehey, "Teachers and the Courts* School-
Related Activities," School Law Update (Topeka, Kansas» 
NOLPE, 1977), p. 337. 
^Blanche t v. Vermilion Parish School Board, pp. 53^-
5^1. 
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powers and did not unreasonably restrict the personal 
liberty of teachers. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee rejected a bearded 
teacher's claim that a school board regulation which 
restricted apparel considered potentially disruptive to 
the classroom atmosphere interfered with his constitutional 
liberty to wear a beard. The court in Morrison v. County 
Board of Education (1973) upheld the dismissal of the 
92 
bearded teacher. 
In the case of Miller v. School District Number 167. 
the Federal Appellate Court considered the argument of 
whether a teacher's dress and hair length requirements vio-
93 
lated a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In 
an opinion rendered by Justice Warren Stevens, the court held that 
a school board can refuse to renew a teacher's employment if 
it finds that his appearance—in this case long sideburns 
and a beard—is inappropriate for the position. He sum­
marized the rights of school and employee thus; 
If a school board should correctly conclude that 
a teacher's style of dress or plumage has an 
adverse impact on the educational process, and 
if that condition conflicts with the teacher's 
interest in selecting his own life style, we have 
no doubt that the interest of the teacher is 
subordinate to the public interest. We must 
assume, however, that sometimes such a school 
92Morrison v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 
k9k S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. 1973)• 
93MiHer v. School District Number 67, ^95 F.2d 
658 (7th Cir. 197*0. 
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board determination will be incorrect. Even 
on that assumption, we are persuaded that the 
importance of allowing school boards sufficient 
latitude to discharge their responsibilities 
effectively—and inevitably, therefore, to make 
mistakes from time to time—outweighs the 
individual interest at stake.9^ 
The United States Supreme Court, in a case concerning 
grooming codes imposed on policemen, further established 
guidelines for which one's "liberty" interest in these 
areas would be observed in public employment. The decision 
in the case of Kellev v. Johnson (1976) distinguished pri­
vacy claims made by state employees from those made by 
members of the general public, noting that the government 
has a much greater interest in regulating its employees than 
it does in regulating the general citizenry.^ It then set 
forth the standard of constitutional challenges whether the 
regulation is "so irrational that it may be branded 'arbi­
trary,* and therefore a deprivation of a 'liberty' interest 
Q 6 
in freedom to choose his own hairstyle."7 In balancing 
the competing interests, between that of the county and of 
the individual policeman, the Court found that the grooming 
code was not irrational and therefore was permissible. 
The impact of the Kellev decision upon future litiga­
tion involving teachers is yet to be determined. It will 
9^lbid., p. 66?. 
^^Kelley v. Johnson, p. 686. 
96ibid. 
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certainly have considerable influence on decision makers 
in future claims of a "liberty" interest in dress and 
grooming. 
A school board policy restricting teacher dress was 
also upheld in a Circuit Court in 1976. The court in 
Tardif v. Quinn backed the school board's termination of a 
French teacher after three years of teaching because her 
hemline came only "half-way down her thigh.The court 
explained that the teacher's interest in selecting her own 
life style was subordinate to the public interest. 
In the East Hartford case, the school board promulgated 
a dress code which required male classroom teachers to wear 
98 
a jacket, shirt, and tie. The plaintiff teacher sought 
to restrain the board from enforcing the code on the grounds 
that it infringed on his protected interest in "personal 
liberty" in dressing as he pleased. The court held that a 
dress code does not unconstitutionally restrain the liberty 
of an individual, and thus it was within the discretion of 
the board to require some formality of dress. 
In a 1978 opinion, written in the case of Pence v. 
Rosenauist. the Seventh Circuit modified its 197^- stance 
97Tardif v. Quinn, 5^5 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1976). 
^®East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, p. 862. 
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taken in Miller.99 The Pence case involved a plaintiff who 
was employed in two positions! as a tenured teacher and as 
a part-time school-bus driver. He was suspended from his 
employment as a bus driver, but not from his position as a 
tenured teacher, because he had a mustache, although it was 
described as being clean and neat. The court held that the 
suspension denied the plaintiff his substantive due process 
rights to liberty and to equal protection under the law of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, because it lacked any rational 
relationship to a proper school policy. As a result of the 
Pence opinion, the court ruled Miller to be too sweeping. 
That decision had stated that an individual's liberty, exer­
cised in the choice of appearance, was so insignificant that 
the denial of public employment did not represent a depriva­
tion that is forbidden by the due process clause. The court 
also pointed out a discrepancy in the 1978 Pence opinion 
and in the Supreme Court's rationale in Kellev v. Johnson, 
the police hair-grooming case. In Kellev. the plaintiff had 
not proven that there was no legitimate purpose served by 
the regulation for policemen; therefore, the regulation was 
upheld. In Pence, however, the plaintiff had shown that 
there was no legitimate purpose served in the regulation 
prohibiting bus drivers from wearing mustaches. Therefore, 
99pence v. Rosenquist, 573 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1978). 
See also Miller v. School District Number 67, 495 F*2d 
658 (7th Cir. 197^). 
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when the plaintiff can carry his original burden of proof, 
the grooming code will be struck down unless the school 
can show that it serves a proper purpose. 
Due Process 
The claim to a "liberty" interest in one's personal 
appearance is vested in the due process clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment, which guarantees procedural due process 
before a person may be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property. Holding a teaching position clearly qualifies as 
a property right, if the teacher has an unexpired contract 
or is tenured, while nontenured teachers may qualify for 
constitutional due process only under certain circumstances. 
In instances where teachers have been dismissed because of 
their appearance, they often have claimed that they were 
denied procedural due process.*0^" 
States have established a variety of statutes govern­
ing procedures relative to the termination of teachers. This 
statutory due process is strictly enforced by the courts, 
and if a procedure is not observed by the school board, 
the discharge will probably be held invalid. In contrast, 
constitutional due process is not stated in terms as spe~ 
cificj therefore, requirements for enforcement are far from 
^00Robert E. Phay, "Dress Codes for Teachers," School 
Law Bulletin X (January 1979)*11-12. 
*®*Reutter and Hamilton, The Law of Public Education, 
p. ̂ 91. 
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definite. For this reason, the question of "fair play" is 
considered, with the concept encompassing different rules 
102 
in accordance with differing facts and kinds of proceedings. 
Procedural due process begins with a hearing at which 
the teacher must have an opportunity to refute the charges 
or to establish that they do not constitute grounds for dis­
missal. Following the hearing, the board must state spe­
cific findings of fact based on evidence introduced at the 
. . 103 
hearing. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives 
one the right to appear "tonsorially unhampered" by adminis­
trative decree. Such was the ruling in Finot. the first of 
the teacher grooming cases, and it served as a precedent 
for Braxton, which held that the constitution likewise pro­
tects a teacher wearing a goatee. 
In Lucia v. Duggan (1971)» the teacher was ordered rein­
stated in his position after being dismissed for ignoring 
an order to remove the beard grown during a vacation 
period.*0^ The decision was based, not on his right to grow 
a beard, but on procedural grounds. The board was found to 
be remiss in failing to notify him of charges or of the 
102Ibid. 103ibid. 
^^inot v. Pasadena Board of Education, 250 Cal. App. 
2d 189» 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967); See also Braxton v. Board 
of Instruction of Duval County, Florida, 3°3 Supp. 958 
(1969). 
^°^Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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consequences of refusing to shave. The board was cited, 
also, for its failure to have a written and announced policy 
on the wearing of facial hair. With regard to the importance 
of the personal liberty involved in this case, the court 
said * 
Whatever the derivation and scope of the 
plaintiff's alleged freedom to wear a beard, it 
is at least an interest of his, especially in 
combination with his professional reputation as 
a school teacher, which may not be taken away 
without due process of law.106 
The absence of proper due process procedures led the 
court to void Lucia's suspension and dismissal, and to order 
his reinstatement. The board was further ordered to compen­
sate him for lost salary and the costs of his court suit, 
and to award him $1,000 of "compensatory damages" for the 
pain and suffering incurred due to his weight loss and for 
107 
the aggravation of an ulcer. ' 
It should be noted that in this case, the defendant 
was not tenured. Under the common law, a nontenured teacher 
need not be granted a hearing unless his constitutional 
rights have been violated. Thus it was necessary to establish 
that a violation of Lucia's constitutional rights had, in 
fact, occurred in order to verify his claim to a hearing. 
In citing this decision, the court in Ramsey v. Hopkins 
(1970) declared that a principal's rule barring mustaches 
was in violation of a teacher's right to due process and equal 
lo6Ibid., pp. 117-118. 107Ibid. 
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protection under the law.*0® The court noted that "personal 
tastes of administrative officials is not permissible 
grounds upon which to base rules for the organization of 
public institutions."*0? Since the teacher's position had 
already been filled •, the court ordered that he be offered 
another job in the school system. 
In the case of McGlone v. Mt. Diablo (1970)» the 
Superior Court of Contra Costa County upheld the dismissal 
of a probationary teacher.Among the accusations made 
by the board was that the plaintiff wore "Capri pants" to a 
football game at a time when the school's official standards 
of dress for female students specifically prohibited them 
from wearing such attire. In upholding the board's decision, 
the court disallowed the claim by the plaintiff that she 
did not receive a proper hearing. 
Action was brought by a teacher seeking judicial review 
of a school board's decision to terminate his employment 
because he wore a beard and sideburns in the Miller case.^* 
The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois dismissed the complaint, and the teacher appealed. 
"*"°®Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477 N.D. Ala. 
(1970). 
109Ibid., p. 489. 
110McGlone v. Mt. Diablo Unified School District, 
82 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1969). 
•^^Miller v. School District Number 67» p. 658. 
10? 
The Court of Appeals held that the school board's desire 
to terminate the teacher's employment, allegedly because 
he wore a beard and sideburns, did not constitute depriva­
tion of due process. 
In a similar opinion rendered in the same year, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the discharge of a teacher 
who refused to shave even though a school board policy 
112 
strictly forbade facial hair. The courts, in deciding 
the case of Morrison v. Hamilton, declared that this did not 
deny the bearded teacher due process or equal protection. 
Conversely, in the absence of a regulation prohibiting 
the wearing of beards by teachers, the Texas Civil Court in 
Ball v. Kerrville (1975) ruled that the termination of a 
bearded teacher was illegal.The plaintiff in this case 
was awarded the remainder of his salary, plus interest. 
In a more recent court case involving teacher dress, 
East Hartford v. Board of Education, the court found that 
the local board did not violate due process of law under the 
114 
Fourteenth Amendment. This was in light of the plaintiff's 
claim that the imposed dress code infringed upon his First 
Amendment right to free expression and his rights to privacy 
112 
Morrison v. Hamilton County Board of Education, p. 770. 
^^Ball v. Kerrville Independent School District, 529 
S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
Xli*jBast Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, p.860. 
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and liberty. The court in responding to both claims found 
the regulation to be reasonable and, therefore, not in vio 
lation of these constitutional rights. 
109 
CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS 
Introduction and Overview 
In reviewing court cases of teacher dress and groom­
ing litigation, certain categories of issues emerge as 
distinctive because of the grounds upon which suits were 
instituted and the decisions rendered in them. 
The oldest and most litigated area involves the wearing 
of religious garb by public school teachers. Because of 
the sensitivity of the issue, this area has been neglected 
in most discussions centering on the dress and grooming of 
teachers and has been treated as a separate entity. It has 
been challenged on numerous occasions, usually on the 
grounds that it violates state constitutional prohibitions 
against sectarian influence in the public schools. Although 
the question of whether local boards can permit the wearing 
of religious garb seems far from settled, the constitution­
ality of statutes and regulations forbidding the wearing 
of religious garb have been generally sustained.^" 
While dress and grooming are considered by the general 
population to be one and the same, the courts have made a 
subtle distinction between the two, which, in turn, has led 
^Reutter and Hamilton, The Law of Public Education. 
p* 29* 
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to the rendering of different opinions in the disposition 
of these cases. The courts generally have recognized 
grooming as a symbol of masculinity, authority, wisdom, or 
racial pride, and as such, under appropriate circumstances, 
have merited it constitutional protection. Although not 
within the literal scope of the First Amendment, various 
grooming practices are usually entitled to peripheral pro­
tection as a form of symbolic speech and a right of expres­
sion. This protection is offered in the absence of the 
condition that it has an adverse effect on the educational 
2 
process. 
Courts consider it to be a more serious invasion of 
a teacher's rights to order him to shave his beard than it 
is to expect him to follow a dress code. The one regulation 
affects a more permanent part of his appearance while the 
other is in effect only during the work day. The courts 
have become increasingly hesitant to interfere with school-
board-established regulations of dress as long as they are 
not unreasonable and arbitrary.-^ 
Organization of Cases Selected for Review 
Cases chosen for review in this chapter were selected 
because they met one or more of the following criteria* 
2Fischer and Schimmel, The Civil Rights of Teachers. 
P. 73. 
3lbid. 
Ill 
1. The case is considered to have been a landmark 
decision in establishing constitutional rights regarding 
dress and grooming and has had a significant impact upon 
subsequent decisions regarding teacher appearance 
2. The case helped to establish a legal precedent or 
case law in a particular issue 
3. The issues in the case presented conflicting 
opinions in the areas of religious garb worn by public 
school teachers, teacher dress, or teacher grooming 
The first category selected for review are those land­
mark United States Supreme Court cases relating to dress and 
grooming. Decisions in these cases have helped to establish 
legal precedents that have significantly influenced teacher 
dress and grooming litigation. Included in this category 
are the following! 
1. Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent School District 
(1969) 
2. Kellev v. Johnson (1976) 
The second series consists of those cases which have 
significantly contributed to the establishment of case law 
or have set legal precedents concerning the religious garb 
worn by public school teachers. Cases selected for review 
in this category include: 
1. Hvsong v. Gallitzen (189^) 
2. O'Connor v. Hendrick (1906) 
3* Rawlines v. Butler (1956) 
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The third category of cases reviewed in this chapter 
consists of those decisions relating to the grooming of 
teachers. These cases have had a substantial impact on the 
legal precedents established in this area. Included are 
the cases of» 
1. Finot v. Pasadena Board of Education (1967) 
2. Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction (1969) 
3* Lucia v. Duggan (19^9) 
4. Morrison v. Hamilton County Board of Education 
(1969) 
The final category of cases are those concerning the 
dress of teachers. Again, selection was made from those 
recent court decisions which have been pertinent to the 
establishment of case law in this area. The following key 
court decisions were selected for reviews 
1. Blanchet v. Vermilion Parish School Board (1969) 
2. James v. Board of Education of Central District 
No. 1 (197^) 
3» East Hartford Education Association v. East 
Hartford Board of Education (1977) 
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United States Supreme Court Landmark Decisions— 
Constitutional Rights in Dress and Grooming 
Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community 
School District. 191 U.S. 501. 89 S.Ct. 
733» 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) 
Overview 
This case was the most far-reaching landmark decision 
and pointed up the changing attitude of courts toward cases 
involving student and teacher freedom of expression. It 
was the basis for many subsequent cases brought by both 
students and teachers in ascertaining their constitutional 
rights. 
Fa£ts 
Several children, whose families were concerned about 
the nation's involvement in the Vietnam War, decided to 
wear black armbands to school in support of a protest calling 
for a moratorium in the conflict. When the students appeared 
at school wearing the armbands, they were suspended on the 
basis of a recently adopted school regulation forbidding 
such demonstrations. The parents sued the school district, 
claiming the constitutional rights of their children had been 
abridged.** 
linker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U.S. 503t 89 S.Ct. 733. 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 
/ 
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Decision 
Justice Abe Fortas of the United States Supreme Court 
announced that, even in light of the special needs of the 
school environment, neither teachers nor children left their 
constitutional rights at the "schoolhouse gate."^ The wear­
ing of black armbands was declared to be "symbolic speech" 
and was ruled to be under First Amendment protection. The 
Court placed considerable weight on the fact that the 
activity which the school sought to regulate had not caused 
any significant disruption, nor had the school any history 
of conflict or disruptive activity. The Court, more 
importantly, established a "balancing test" which was to 
guide school authorities seeking to regulate student behavior 
in constitutionally protected interests. 
Legal Precedents Established 
While the issue of armbands directly related to students, 
the courts also went one step further in establishing the 
constitutional rights of teachers. Other legal principles 
established in this decision are as followsi 
1. The wearing of arm bands for the purpose of 
expressing certain views is a type of symbolic act that 
is within First Amendment guarantees* 
2. First Amendment rights, applied in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment, are 
5lbid., p. 506. 
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available to teachers and students. "It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their con­
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate."^ 
3. Where there has been no evidence shown that 
engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and sub­
stantially" interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school, the prohibition 
cannot be sustained. 
4. Schools are not "enclaves of totalitarianism," 
and school authorities do not possess "absolute authority" 
over their students.'' 
Kellev v. Johnson 
425 U.S. 238 (1976) 
Overview 
Although this case deals with dress and grooming regula­
tions imposed upon police officers, the decision has been 
instrumental in resolving recent cases involving teacher 
dress and grooming. Much of this is due to the fact that 
both teachers and police officers, as public employees, are 
regulated by rules not ordinarily mandated for other citizens. 
6Ibid. 
?Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public Interest, 
pp. 84-85* 
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gacts 
In this case, the Police Commissioner had promulgated 
an order which established hair-grooming standards appli­
cable to male members of the police force. The regulation 
was attacked by the plaintiff as violating his right of 
free expression under the First Amendment and his guarantee 
of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The patrolman argued that the regulation was 
"not based upon the generally accepted standard of grooming 
in the community" and that it placed an undue restriction 
o 
upon his activities. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York originally dismissed the plaintiff's request for relief 
whereby he sought action against a regulation limiting the 
length of a policeman's hair. The plaintiff then remanded 
to the Court of Appeals and ultimately to the United States 
o 
Supreme Court for judgment. 
Decision 
Justice William Rehnquist's opinion indicated that 
the enactment of the regulation was not so irrational that 
it could be considered a deprivation of the officer's liberty 
interest in freedom to choose his hair style. The United 
®Kelley v. Johnson, kZ5 U.S. 238 (1976). 
9lbid. 
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States Supreme Court ruled that, under certain specified 
instances» the state could make and enforce restrictive 
regulations. The test placed on such regulations, "where 
the claim implicates only the more general contours of 
the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment," is whether the individual can demonstrate that 
there is no rational connection between the regulations 
and the promotion of safety of persons and property,10 
In addressing the county police department's decision to 
adopt a dress and grooming code, the Court maintained that 
this choice may be based on a desire to make 
police officers readily recognizable to the 
members of the public, or a desire for the 
esprit de crops which such similarity is felt 
to inculcate within the police force itself.H 
The Court held that either purpose was a sufficient rational 
justification for the regulations thereby defeating the 
policeman's claim based on the liberty guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Discussion 
The full impact of this decision on school districts 
is not fully known. In light of this decision, it would 
appear that a school board may adopt reasonable grooming 
codes as long as they are applied equitably and can be 
defended on the basis of some educationally sound rationale. 
10Ibid., p. 2^5. i:LIbid., p. 248. 
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Cases Related to the Religious Garb 
Worn bv Public School Teachers 
Hvsong v. Gallitzin Borough School District 
164- Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894) 
£scts 
The question of the garb worn by Roman Catholic 
sisters while teaching came before the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in 1894. The plaintiffs, John Hysong and 
others, sought to restrain the school district from per­
mitting sectarian teaching in the common schools, from 
employing sisters of the Roman Catholic Church as teachers, 
and from permitting the wearing of religious garb by 
12 
teachers in the public schools. 
Decision 
The court, in ruling for the defendants, concluded 
that, in the absence of proof that religious instruction 
was imparted by the nuns, the school district could not be 
restrained from employing nuns to teach, nor could it be 
restrained from permitting them to teach garbed in religious 
attire.13 
The court further stated that the wearing of the garb 
and insignia of such sisterhoods while teaching in the 
•^Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School District, 164 
Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894). 
13lbid., p. 482. 
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public schools could not be termed "sectarian teaching," 
and was, therefore, not unlawful.1** 
Discussion 
The court in this instance felt that the religious 
belief of such teachers was well known to the neighborhood 
and to the pupils, even without their wearing a special kind 
of dress. The court, therefore, concluded that religious 
garb worn by the teachers would have little effect upon the 
students. 
It is important to note that the court suggested that 
the legislature might, by statute, force all teachers in 
the public schools to wear a particular style of dress and 
to prohibit all others. As a result, several states passed 
legislative prohibitions of this nature which were subse­
quently upheld as valid by the courts. In this case, however, 
in the absence of such a statute, the court was forced to 
uphold the right of such teachers to be employed in the 
public school system. 
Although this case is a very old one, the case law it 
established was used in the more recent cases of Gerhardt 
and Rawlings in upholding the right of teachers to wear 
1^Ibid. 
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religious garb in the public schools, as long as they did 
not teach nor impart their religious beliefs.*5 
O'Connor v. Hedrick 
184- N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906) 
Facts 
On May 28, 1903, the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction promulgated a regulation which strictly forbade 
public school teachers from wearing "unusual dress or garb, 
worn exclusively by members of one religious denomination," 
during school hours."^ The superintendent further declared 
it to be the duty of school authorities to require such 
teachers to discontinue the wearing of such garb while in 
the public school classroom. 
On May 29, 1903» Patrick Hedrick, the school trustee, 
informed the plaintiff, Nora O'Connor, of the new require­
ment! nevertheless, she continued to teach school wearing 
the prohibited garb until the end of the school year, in June. 
Mr. Hedrick made no effort to dismiss Sister O'Connor during 
this time. 
Action was brought against Mr. Hedrick by Sister 
O'Connor in an attempt to recover lost salary due her under 
the terms of her contract. Mr. Hedrick defended his action 
^Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W. 127 (1936). 
See also Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 Ky. (1956)# 
'Connor v. Hedrick, 184 N.Y. 4-21, 77 N.E. 612 (1906). 
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on the grounds that she lost her right to recover anything 
because she continued to wear the distinctive religious 
garb after she had received word of the superintendent's 
17 
decision. 
Decision 
The court held that, when teachers in a public school 
refuse to comply with regulations forbidding the use of 
religious dress, they forfeit their rights to further com­
pensation under their contracts. 
The court also upheld, as reasonable and valid, the 
regulation prohibiting teachers in public schools from wear­
ing distinctly religious garb while teaching. The effect of 
such apparel was viewed as being distinctly sectarian and 
as violating a state policy forbidding the use of state 
money to aid sectarian influences. 
Discussion 
This case was instrumental in the writing of subsequent 
decisions that prohibited public school teachers from wear­
ing religious garb. 
The court, in this decision, stated that the wearing of 
religious garb denoted sectarian influence even though the 
teachers did not instruct the students in their religious 
doctrines. Cases that have upheld the right of teachers to 
*?Ibid., p. 613. 
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wear the religious garb conversely felt that th© mere wear­
ing of the garb did not suggest sectarian influence. 
Rawlings v. Butler 
290 S.W.2d 801 Ky. (1956) 
Facts 
In this Kentucky case a citizen of Marion County 
brought suit against the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
in Kentucky and the boards of education in the counties of 
Casey, Washington, Meade, and Grayson. He questioned the 
right of these school systems to spend tax funds to employ 
Catholic nuns, wearing religious garb and symbols, to teach 
in these public schools* In addition, he questioned the 
right of county boards to pay rent to the Catholic Church 
for the use of their buildings in which public school classes 
were taught and to pay for the transportation of Catholic 
18 
children in attendance at parochial schools. It was 
stipulated that the sisters, all members of orders within 
the Roman Catholic Church, wore a habit comprised of a tunic 
and scapular of white wool, a leather belt to which a rosary 
was attached, a veil, and a linen headband.^ 
The specific constitutional enactments that, it was 
alleged, forbade the boards* actions were Article 6 and the 
First Amendment of the Constitution and Sections 1 and 5 of 
l8Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 Ky. (1956). 
1^Ibid., p. 803. 
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the Kentucky Constitution. These guaranteed religious free­
dom to all citizens of the state. The Kentucky Constitution 
also prohibited money, raised by taxation for public pur­
poses or for educational purposes, from being used in the 
aid of any church, sectarian, or denominational school.20 
Decision 
The court, in ruling for the defendants, felt that, 
while the dress and emblems worn by these sisters proclaimed 
them to be members of certain organizations of the Roman 
Catholic Church who had taken certain religious vows, these 
facts did not deprive them of their right to teach in public 
schools, as long as they did not inject religion or dogma of 
pi 
the church into their instruction. 
The court noted further that the General Assembly of 
Kentucky had not prescribed what dress a woman must wear; 
therefore, to prevent them from teaching in the public schools 
because of their religious beliefs would be to deny them equal 
protection under the law, a violation of the Fourteenth 
22 
Amendment of the federal Constitution. 
With respect to the renting of school buildings from the 
church, the court said the practice was not constitutionally 
illegal in the absence of evidence that the church attempted 
to influence or control the ways the schools were conducted 
23 
or operated or how the students were taught. J 
20lbid., pp. 801-802. 21i^i(j#f p, 804. 
22Ibid., p. 809• 23lbid., p. 801. 
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In commenting on the question of the school board's 
transporting children to parochial schools* the court ruled 
that the board could not use money raised by taxes for 
Oil 
school purposes to pay for such servicesa 
Discussion 
The fact that the plaintiff neither questioned the 
scholastic or moral qualifications of the sisters employed 
to teach in the public schools# nor contended that the 
sisters taught the tenets of their church, was instrumental 
in the court's decision. Instead, the plaintiff had based 
his objection solely on the fact that the sisters wore 
religious garments and emblems in the-performance of their 
duties. 
The court pointed out that the general assembly "has 
not yet prescribed what dress a woman teaching in the public 
schools must wear."2^ Here again, as in the Hvsong case, 
it appears that, in the absence of a state law or statute 
forbidding it, teachers are allowed to wear religious garb 
as long as they do not force their religious views on the 
pupils under their charge. 
This decision, however, was not unanimous since Judge 
J• Hogg wrote a significant dissenting opinion. In his 
analysis of previously cited cases, he came to different con­
clusions than did the majority. He felt that 
2^Ibid«, p. 802. 25ibid., p. 804. 
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• • . by the majority opinion these children and 
their parents are deprived of their constitutional 
right to be free from sectarian influence and 
indirect teaching of the Catholic Church at public 
expense•26 
This again points up the dilemma in this issue. The 
courts have been unable to balance the constitutional rightsf 
that must be respected and observed, of both teachers and 
students• 
Cases Related to Teacher Grooming 
Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education 
250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (196?) 
Facts 
In September 1973» paul Finot, for seven years a high 
school teacher in the Pasadena school system, arrived at 
school wearing a recently grown beard. The principal 
promptly requested that he shave it off, and upon Finot's 
refusal, the board of education transferred him to a home 
teaching position, despite the fact that he was recognized 
as an effective and challenging teacher. Finot branded his 
transfer as "unconstitutional" and went to court to force 
the board to change its action.2? 
The board justified its actions on the basis of the 
professional judgment of the principal and superintendent 
and on the school's administrative policy which had been 
26Ibid., p. 812. 
2?Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 250 Cal. 
App. 2d 189» 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). 
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in force for three years. This policy was based on the 
city's teacher handbook, which called for teachers to 
practice the common social amenities as evidenced by 
acceptable dress and grooming and to set an example of neat-
pO 
ness and good taste* 
The board's action was also based on the "professional 
judgment" of Finot's principal and superintendent. They 
explained that the appearance of teachers has a definite 
effect on student dress, and that student dress has a 
definite correlation with student behavior. Their concern 
was that Finot's beard might attract undue attention, inter­
fere with the process of education, and make the prohibition 
of beards for students more difficult to enforce. They also 
felt that wearing a beard did not meet the school's require­
ment for acceptable grooming and did not set an exanple of 
29 
good taste. 7 
Decision 
After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial 
judge found that the board's action in changing Finot's 
teaching assignment was a lawful and reasonable exercise of 
its discretion. Finot and the American Civil Liberties Union 
were not satisfied, however, and took the case to the United 
States District Court in California. 
28Ibid. 29lbid. 
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The District Court supported Finot's argument that 
the board's action in transferring him to home teaching was 
unconstitutional. The court stated that Finot's right to 
wear a beard was one of the liberties protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits 
the deprivation of any person's life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. In holding for the teacher the 
court stated, in part* 
A beard, for a man, is an expression of his 
personality. On the one hand, it has been inter­
preted as a symbol of masculinity, of authority, 
and of wisdom. On the other hand, it has been 
interpreted as a symbol of non-conformity and 
rebellion. But symbols, under appropriate circum­
stances, merit constitutional protection—his 
constitutional right to do so outweighs the judg­
ment of the principal and superintendent, however 
experienced, expert, and professional such judgment 
may have been. Prior restraints of expression may 
not ordinarily be used to limit First Amendment 
freedoms.30 
Discussion 
The Finot case held that a beard is a form of personal 
expression or symbolic speech and is therefore entitled to 
peripheral protection under the First Amendment. This does 
not, however, mean that a school system can set no limits 
upon these grooming practices. It does mean that, for a 
school to require a waiver of such liberties as a condition 
of employment, it would probably have to meet three tests 
suggested by a California court* (1) there must be a rational 
3°Ibid., pp. 528-529. 
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relationship between the restriction in question and the 
effectiveness of the educational system, (2) the benefits 
which the public gains by the restraints must outweigh the 
resulting impairment of constitutional rights, and (3) no 
alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights are 
available. 
The court held, in the Finot case, that the school 
board had failed to meet the second and third tests. It 
ruled that the benefit gained in supporting school rules out­
lawing student beards did not outweigh Finot*s right to wear 
a beard while teaching in a classroom. Furthermore, there 
were other alternatives available to the school board to deter 
students from wearing beards that were less subversive of 
Finot*s rights than the administrative regulation in question. 
This case was the first of the grooming cases involving 
teachers and is still recognized in decisions as having set 
legal precedent on the subject. 
Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval 
County. Florida. 303 F. Supp. 958 (1969) 
Facts 
A black male teacher was employed at Ribault Senior 
High School in Duval County, Florida, as an instructor in 
French. Booker C. Peek, considered a superior teacher, 
31lbid., p. 199. 
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sported a goatee as a symbol of racial pride.32 The prin­
cipal had requested repeatedly that Peek remove his goatee, 
but Mr. Peek repeatedly refused. As a result, on the prin­
cipal's recommendation, Mr. Peek was not reappointed to the 
Duval County School System for the 1969-70 school year.33 
Peek felt that his constitutional rights had been 
violated by the action and went to court to seek reappoint­
ment. The school board claimed that its decision was based 
on a reasonable exercise of the principal's discretionary 
power to insure appropriate dress. No evidence was presented 
to indicate that Peek's goatee might reasonably be expected 
to disrupt discipline or cause students to wear inappropriate 
dress.3^ 
Decision 
The court held that the wearing of a beard by a teacher 
is a constitutionally protected liberty under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court stated that 
when a goatee is worn by a black man as an expression of 
his heritage, culture, and racial pride, "its wearer also 
enjoys the protection of First Amendment rights."35 
There were no written policies or rules in the school 
system regulating the discretion conferred upon each 
32Braxton v. Board of Public Education of Duval County, 
Florida, 30 3 F. Supp. 958 (1969). 
33Ibid. ^ibid. 35ibid., p. 958. 
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principal by the school board in matters of personal appear­
ance. In the absence of such regulations! the action of the 
principal in requesting the removal of the goatee was, 
according to the court, "arbitrary, unreasonable, and based 
on personal preference."^* 
The decision not to reappoint Peek was found to be 
racially motivated and tainted with "institutional racism."^ 
These effects were manifested in an intolerance of ethnic 
diversity and racial pride. 
In view of these circumstances, the court ordered the 
school board to reappoint Booker Peek on the same basis and 
with the same assignment as would have been made if the 
recommendation of his principal had been favorable. 
Discussion 
This is the only court case to date relating to teacher 
dress and grooming which has been decided on the basis of 
racial overtones. Thus, the courts, in the future, might 
protect a black teacher of African Studies who wears a 
dashiki because of its direct relevance to his job or as a 
matter of academic freedom and racial pride. It is doubt­
ful, however, that any court would protect an English 
teacher who insists upon appearing in class attired in jeans, 
sandals, and a T-shirt because he does not approve of middle-
class attire. 
36lbid. 37Ibid. 
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The courts have clearly established that not all styles 
of grooming and dress will be considered as syaibolic 
expression. Since beards and goatees apparently fall into 
this category, one could argue that an Afro hairstyle is a 
symbol of racial pride. A plaintiff's difficulty, in such 
a case, lies in convincing a court that the clothing or 
grooming style in dispute indeed represents symbolic 
expression. 
Lucia v. Duggan 
303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969) 
Factg 
In a small Massachusetts town of about four thousand 
people, a teacher named David Lucia began growing a beard 
during the 1968-1969 winter vacation. He returned to 
teaching in January with a short, neat, and well-trimmed 
beard that caused no disruption in his classroom. 
Within a week after school resumed, the superintendent 
told Lucia that there was an unwritten policy requiring 
teachers to be clean-shaven on the job. The following week, 
in accordance with instructions of the school committee, the 
superintendent informed Lucia by letter of a school policy 
against wearing beards and mustaches and specifically 
requested Lucia to shave his beard. 
Lucia then met with the school committee, each of whose 
members stated his reasons for feeling it inappropriate for 
38Ibid. 
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a teacher to wear a beard in class* At the conclusion of 
the meetingf Lucia told one of the members that the town 
was behind the times.39 
The following week the committee met and voted to 
suspend Lucia because he refused to shave and was setting 
an improper example for students to follow. Lucia was not 
notified of the meeting nor was he informed that the school 
committee was going to consider suspending him. Two weeks 
later the committee met in executive session to vote on 
Lucia's dismissal* Again, Lucia was not notified of the 
meeting but heard about it and asked for a postponement so 
that he could seek legal counsel* His request was deniedt 
and the committee voted to dismiss him.2*0 
Lucia attempted to secure employment as a teacher but 
was unsuccessful. He remained unemployed for six weeks and 
then worked periodically in a factory for about two-thirds 
of his former salary. During this trying time, Lucia lost 
fifteen pounds, and a pre-existing ulcer was aggravated. 
Lucia then went to court to reverse what he considered to be 
his "improper dismissal" and to seek damages against the 
school committee. 
39;Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F» Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969)* 
**°Ibid. ^Ibid. 
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DgcjsigP 
The court did not decide on the question of whether or 
not wearing a beard was a constitutional right. Instead* it 
ruled that Lucia's freedom to wear a beard, especially in 
combination with his professional reputation as a teacher, 
could not be taken from him without due process of law. 
The court noted two deficiencies in the procedures 
followed in suspending and dismissing Lucia. First, he was 
not specifically informed of the charges against himi neither 
was he made aware that his refusal to remove his beard would 
result in dismissal. Secondly, prior to Lucia's controversy 
with the school committee, no written or announced policy 
existed that stated teachers should not wear beards in the 
classroom. In criticizing the committee's lack of due 
process, the court observed: 
The American public school system, which has 
a basic responsibility for instilling in its 
students an appreciation of our democratic system, 
is a peculiarly appropriate plgce for the use of 
fundamentally fair procedures.^2 
This lack of fair procedures led the court to void 
Lucia's suspension and dismissal. It ordered his reinstate­
ment, compensated him for lost salary and for the costs of 
his court suit, and awarded him $1,000 in compensatory damages. 
Payment was awarded for the pain and suffering incurred in 
connection with his loss of weight and the aggravation of his 
ulcer, both caused by his unlawful dismissal. 
^2Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
13^ 
Discussion 
The Lucia case held that, even if wearing a beard is 
not a constitutional right* school officials cannot dismiss 
teachers for wearing a beard unless (1) there is a published 
school policy outlawing beards* (2) teachers are given 
adequate notice of the policy and the consequences of not 
adhering to it, and (3) a fair hearing is held to judge the 
specific alleged violation. 
Thus, the court established certain minimum due process 
procedures that would apply to a school system that wants 
to control whether or not teachers wear beards, mustaches, 
or long hair. 
Morrison v. Hamilton County Board of Education 
^ S.W.2d 770 (Term. 1973) 
Pa£ls 
This case presents the issue of whether a teacher in 
the public schools in the state of Tennessee can wear a full 
beard in violation of a statute authorized by the board of 
education prohibiting it. 
The school board discharged Jack Morrison, a tenured 
teacher in the system, for alleged insubordination for 
refusing to shave his beard. The board felt that the beard 
worn by Mr. Morrison was potentially disruptive of the educa­
tional process and was in violation of rules a teacher was 
required to obey. Mr. Morrison contended that the board, in 
discharging him, had deprived him of the right to teach, as 
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guaranteed by the tenure act, and of liberty or property 
without due process of law, guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.^ 
Decision 
The court concluded that the board's regulation for­
bidding teachers to wear beards was within the bounds of 
reason and did not deny the plaintiff any right under the 
Teacher Tenure Act. The court further stated that, because 
the rule was "reasonable and not discriminatory,M and Mr. 
Morrison continued to fail to obey it, the plaintiff was 
IlU 
accurately charged with insubordination. 
Discussion 
The Morrison decision was influenced heavily by the 
court's conviction that the schools should be controlled by 
boards of education. This rule, of course, would apply only 
as long as the control could be considered reasonable and 
was not arbitrary. 
The court also pointed out the special nature of the 
school that must be considered. While recognizing personal 
grooming to be largely a matter of choice, the court also 
contended that grooming affects everyone? "we have to look 
at each other whether we like it or not."^ 
^3Morrison v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 
k9h S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. 1973). 
^Ibid., p. 7?k. ^ibid., p. 773. 
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The opinion in this case was in opposition to a majority 
of its predecessors* It is* therefore, important to con­
sider the elements in each case rather than to make sweeping 
generalizations in those areas not clearly decided by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Cases Related to Teacher Dress 
Blanchet v. Vermilion Parish School Board 
220 So. 2d 534 (1969) 
Facts 
In September 1967* a Louisiana school board passed a 
policy requiring male teachers to wear neckties in the 
official performance of their duties during the course of 
the school day. They did, however, excuse teachers of physi­
cal education, industrial arts, and vocational agriculture 
kS 
when they taught outdoor or shop classes. 
Edward Blanchet, the father of seven and an exemplary 
teacher for eighteen years, asked the school board to recon­
sider the policy. Responding to the request, the board 
studied and reaffirmed its policy. 
When Blanchet refused to comply with the necktie require­
ment, he was charged with "willful neglect of duty" and was 
k? 
suspended until he agreed to comply. ' 
**^Blanchet v. Vermilion Parish School Board# 220 So. 2d 
53^ (1969). 
^Ibid. 
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Blanchet filed suit, asserting that the necktie rule 
was unrelated to any legitimate educational objective and 
that it violated his constitutional right to dress as he 
pleased. He proved that few other school boards in Louisiana 
required teachers to wear neckties, largely because neck­
ties are extremely uncomfortable in the spring and summer 
months. The school board responded by showing that pro­
fessional men in positions of authority were generally 
expected to wear neckties.^® 
Decision 
Despite Blanchet's convictions, arguments, and evidence, 
the court did not rule in his favor. In weighing the evi­
dence presented by both sides in this dispute, the court 
felt it was compelled to defer to the judgment of the members 
of the school board who were elected by their community to 
administer the schools. The court seemed to indicate that, 
if it had been the school board, it might not have passed 
the new policy, but it also indicated that it could not sub­
stitute its views for the judgment of the board.^ 
Blanchet had argued that the policy should be considered 
an unconstitutional infringement upon his personal liberty 
to dress as he wished. The court acknowledged that the "con­
stitutional issue is not free from doubt," especially "in 
view of some of the more recent federal pronouncements."^0 
^Sibid. 49Ibid. 50Ibid.t p, 539# 
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Nevertheless* it ruled that "the school board's necktie 
regulation may be held valid as not unreasonably restricting 
the personal liberty of the teacher-employee to dress as he 
wills."51 
Finally, the court decreed that Blanchet should be 
reinstated to his position "on his statement that he intends 
to comply with the policy requiring the wearing of neck­
ties* "52 
Discussion 
As previously suggested* courts sometimes treat rules 
of dress differently from rules of grooming because clothing 
can be more easily changed when a teacher leaves the school 
yard than can a grooming style. This may have played a sig­
nificant role in the court's decision. 
The Blanchet case held that a dress policy for teachers 
is a matter of administrative discretion and is not subject 
to judicial review, unless it is clearly unreasonable or 
arbitrary. This is based on legal principles providing that, 
within the limits of their authority, the wisdom or good 
judgment of school boards cannot be questioned by the courts. 
Members of school boards are presumably elected or appointed 
because of their fitness for the responsibility. In con­
trast, judges are chosen because of their legal knowledge, 
not for their experience in administering a public school 
51Ibid. 52ibid., p. 1. 
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system. Only when evidence shows that the action of a 
board is arbitrary or unreasonable is a court justified in 
interfering. Since, in this case, the court found that 
there was a rational basis for the board's policy, it 
could not be overturned as arbitrary and unreasonable. 
James v. B * - - - - « - - trict No. 1 
In this case it was charged that school officials had 
violated the constitutional rights of a teacher by dis­
charging him because he wore a black armband to school as a 
Charles James, an eleventh-grade English teacher, 
observed November 14, 1969» a Moratorium Day in protest over 
the Vietnam War, and wore a black armband on the left sleeve 
of his sport coat when he arrived at school that morning. 
He followed a routine schedule and heard no complaints from 
either students or teachers concerning his actions. 
Midway through his second period class, he was called 
to report to the principal's office. The principal, Mr. 
Millard, asked James why he was wearing the armband. James 
responded, "Because I am against killing." Dillard told 
James that he considered the armband a political act against 
53James v. Board of Education of Central District No. 1, 
385 F. Supp. 209 D.C.N.Y. (1974). 
Facts 
symbolic protest against the Vietnam War.^3 
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the President of the United States and asked James to take 
it off. 
Dillard then sent James to the office of the District 
Principalt Edward J. Brown, who also asked why James was 
wearing the armband. James told Brown that it was to demon­
strate his opposition to killing and explained his Quaker 
beliefs. Brown told James that he felt that the wearing 
of the armband had political connotations and that it was 
contrary to the teachers* code of ethics* felt 
it to be disruptive to the education processf and 
that it might lead to further, disruptiveness and 
divisiveness among teachers.54 
Brown thus suspended James pending Brown's seeking 
legal counsel and advice from the board of education. The 
school board met* without notifying Jamesf and enacted a 
three-day suspension because of this "political act.*^ 
James observed the suspension and returned to work 
without incident until another Moratorium Day was observed 
the following month, whereupon he again wore an armband. 
The school board promptly suspended him from his position. 
James then sought relief from the courts for what he con­
sidered to be a violation of his constitutional rights.^ 
Pepjgjpn 
In deciding for James, the court held that the wearing 
of a black armband, as in Tinker, was a right under the 
5^Ibid., p. 212. 55ibid., p. 213. 56ibid. 
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First Amendment, akin to pure speech* The court addedt 
Any limitation on the exercise of constitu­
tional rights can be justified only by a con­
clusion based upon reasonable inferences flowing 
from concrete facts and not abstractions, that 
the interests of discipline or sound education 
are materially and substantially jeopardized, 
whether the danger stems initially from the con­
duct of students or teachers.57 
Chief Judge Curtin of the District Court held that 
(1) the school officials failed to prove, as justification 
for firing, some sort of actual educational or disciplinary 
disruption? furthermore, it was evident that only symbols 
expressing one side of the war issue were deemed to be a 
prohibited political act by the school officials, and (2) 
James was entitled to compensatory damages in the nature of 
back pay and was also entitled to an award of costs and 
attorneys' fees. 
Discussion 
The court, in this case, was armed with guidelines 
from Tinker, which had been established for students in a 1969 
case. In both instances, the court emphasized that, in 
dealing with symbols of expression, the burden of proof is 
on the school board to show that the symbol materially or 
substantially disrupts the educational process. 
It is interesting to note, that although this armband 
is not a permanent part of one's appearance and could be 
57Ibid., p. 215. 58lbid., p. 209. 
I k 2  
easily worn after school hours( the court deemed this a 
constitutionally protected expression of speech* This is 
in contrast to decisions handed down in dress cases where 
judges have generally felt that the freedom to dress as 
one wishes begins after school hours* 
East Hartford Education Association v. East 
Hartford Board of Education 
562 F.2d 838 2nd Cir. (197?) 
Facts 
Action was brought by a teacher challenging the consti­
tutionality of a public school teachers* dress code adopted 
by the East Hartford Board of Education. This regulation 
required Richard Brimley, plaintiff in the case, to wear a 
tie while teaching English but not while teaching his film­
making class* He refused to wear a tie to English class and 
was reprimanded* After exhausting the school's internal 
review procedure, he and his union, the East Hartford Educa­
tion Association, sued in a federal district court, seeking 
both a declaratory judgment that the dress code was unconsti­
tutional and an injunction against its enforcement*^9 
Brimley felt that the dress code infringed upon his 
protected interest in personal liberty in dressing as he 
pleased* In part, he argued that this was a symbolic act 
within the free speech clause of the First Amendment* He 
59East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford 
Board of Education, 562 F*2d 838 2nd Cir* (1977)* 
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stated the following reasons for his choosing to wear a sport 
shirt without a tie or a sport coat or sweaters 
(1) that he wishes to present himself to his 
students as a person not tied to establishment 
conformity! (2) he wants to symbolically indicate 
to his students, his association with what he 
believes to be the ideas of the generation to 
which the students belong* including the rejection 
of many of the customs and values and social 
outlook of the older generation! and (3) he 
believes that dress of this type enables him to 
achieve a closer rapport with his students and 
thus enhances his ability to teach.°0 
Brimley further stated that the board could not restrain 
his personal liberty in this fashion unless it showed that 
his dressing as he pleased "would materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of the appropriate disci­
pline for the proper administration of the school."6l 
In summary, the constitutional issues raised in this 
case challenging a school dress code are basically two* 
(1) To what extent, if any, is the form of dress an expression 
of symbolic speech protected under the First Amendment? 
(2) Are a person's dress and liberty or privacy interest 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment?62 
Decision 
The court concluded its discussion of the First Amend­
ment by stating that Brimley's speech claim was "so 
6oIbid., p. 95. 6lIbid., p. 96. 62Ibid. 
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unsubstantial as to border on the frivolous.It noted 
that only when symbolic speech is very close to pure speech 
does it warrant First Amendment protection, and it felt that 
Brimley had more effective ways of expressing his social 
views to his students. 
The court held that a dress code does not unconstitu­
tionally restrain the liberty of an individual, and thus it 
is within the discretion of the board to require some for­
mality of dress. The court expressed its views regarding 
the interest of the board in requiring a male teacher to 
wear a coat and tie as follows* 
Teachers set an example in dress and grooming for 
their students to follow. A teacher who under­
stands this precept and adheres to it enlarges the 
importance of the task of teaching, presents an 
image of dignity, and encourages respect for 
authority, which acts as a positive factor in main­
taining classroom discipline. 
The plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof in 
demonstrating that the school board's dress code was so 
irrational that it might be branded arbitrary. The court 
found that Brimley*s freedom of choice was unlimited—that 
is, he was "free to go elsewhere and find a school system 
where conformity to a dress code is not required. 
Discussion 
In this most recent case of teacher dress and grooming, 
the court strengthened the hand of the school board in 
63ibid., p. 98. 6^Ibid. 65lbid., p. 99. 
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establishing the validity of a faculty dress code* In this 
ease the court returned several times to the point that 
schools are under the control of duly elected local boards 
of education* 
In addition, the court pointed out that states maintain 
interests in their employees beyond those they maintain over 
the public in general. For this reason, personal liberties, 
as an employee, differ from the liberties enjoyed as a citi­
zen. Teachers, as public servants, are often placed under 
restraints in their professional lives to which other citi­
zens are not subjected. 
This case clearly demonstrates that the issue of "dress" 
is a facet of a teacher's professional life which can be 
regulated during school hours since it is regarded as a less 
serious interference with one's personal liberty than is 
"grooming." 
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CHAPTER V ' 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Historically, teachers have been held up as examples of 
proper dress and grooming. Their rights to personal privacy 
have always been restricted to guard against public appear­
ance considered unacceptable. Before World War II, teachers 
were held under stringent control by school administrators 
and were expected, even required, to exhibit only the most 
sedate dress and grooming both in and out of the schoolhouse. 
Through successful court action during the late six­
ties and early seventies, educators gained much recognition 
in their struggle for expression of personal freedoms. 
Among the cases heard were those in which teachers sought 
relief from school board and administrative regulations 
regarding personal dress and grooming. 
From an analysis of judicial decisions, it appears 
that the major factor in deciding these cases was one of 
balance. On the one side, the teacher, as an adult and a 
citizen, argued for the fundamental right to dress and groom 
himself as he chose; on the other side, school authorities 
strived to maintain their long-established control over both 
teachers and students. While the right to adorn oneself as 
one chooses, within the bounds of decency, is a fundamental 
right of citizens of a democracy, the issue becomes more 
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complex as one moves from the general status of "citizen" 
to the particular status of "teacher." School authorities, 
in arguing for the validity of regulatory limitations 
regarding dress and grooming, have stressed the importance 
of such limits to ensure a climate favorable to the educa­
tional process. Judges have based their case decisions upon 
a variety of statutory and constitutional grounds, upon 
general principles, and upon the concept of reasonableness. 
This study was not intended to reach any conclusions 
regarding the educational advantages or disadvantages of the 
various styles of dress and grooming a teacher might choose 
to display in the classroom. From a review of the research, 
however, it is apparent that this has been and will continue 
to be an issue for debate. For this reason, when boards of 
education or school officials feel the need to establish 
rules and regulations governing a teacher's appearance, they 
should have access to appropriate information concerning both 
the educational and legal ramifications of these issues in 
order that their decisions may be both legally and educa­
tionally sound. 
As a guide to research, several questions were formu­
lated and listed in the introductory chapter of this study. 
Although the review of literature provided the background 
necessary for examining these issues, most of the questions 
were answered in Chapters III and IV. These answers provide 
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the justification for the major portion of a set of legal 
guidelines which school administrators and other educational 
decision makers can use when formulating policies related 
to teacher dress and grooming practices. 
Summary 
The first research guide question listed in Chapter I 
was designed to determine the extent to which school 
authorities can constitutionally control a teacher's mode 
of dress or grooming. An analysis of research reveals that, 
at the least, any effort by a school system to regulate a 
teacher's mode of dress or grooming must be based upon 
factual conditions warranting the conclusion that the question­
able attire would disrupt the educational process. Never­
theless, there is no question that school boards may estab­
lish reasonable standards with respect to the appearance of 
teachers. The courts have become increasingly hesitant to 
make "school decisions" as long as the imposed regulations 
do not restrict the constitutional rights of teachers. 
Judicial opinions have repeatedly stated that the day-to-day 
operations of the schools should be directed by the school 
board. Administrative decision makers, therefore, may assume 
that, as long as regulations are reasonable and sure nondis­
criminatory, they will be upheld by the courts. 
The second question posed in the introductory chapter 
concerned the extent to which school officials can constitu­
tionally discipline or terminate the employment of a teacher 
1^9 
because he does not conform to conventional standards of 
grooming. An analysis of cases reviewed in Chapters III 
and IV indicates that a teacher may face reprimand or termina­
tion of employment in instances where reasonable and nondis­
criminatory rules are ignored. The courts have, however, 
remained adamant in insisting that due process procedures 
must accompany any disciplinary action or termination of 
a teacher's position. Defendants must show evidence of 
having established and published regulations, and the teacher 
must have been informed of the consequences of wearing his 
chosen dress or grooming before dismissal procedures can 
be initiated. 
The third question examines the extent to which the 
courts have treated the issues of dress and grooming 
separately. The distinction made by the courts between 
teacher dress and teacher grooming has been instrumental 
in the outcome of many appearance cases. The courts, in most 
instances, have upheld the right of a teacher to groom as 
he wishes as long as it does not disrupt the educational 
process nor create a health or safety hazard. Teacher 
dress, on the other hand, has been viewed differently by 
the judiciary. The courts generally have ruled in favor of 
the school board in upholding its right to make and impose 
regulations deemed necessary for the enhancement of the 
educational environment. Judicial thinking has been that an 
individual's grooming practices are a personal aspect of 
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one's personality that cannot be easily removed when the 
teacher enters his professional role. Dress, however, is 
easily changeable upon leaving the school grounds and, there­
fore, dress regulations are not as restrictive of a teacher's 
private life. 
The fourth question listed in Chapter I was to identify 
the litigable issues revealed through judicial decisions. 
The courts are faced with determining the extent to which a 
teacher's constitutional rights are violated and the point 
at which the state's interest in the education of its children 
should be paramount. In addition, the distinction made by 
the courts in dress and grooming has been instrumental 
in deciding individual cases. Determining what aspects of 
a teacher's appearance are constitutionally protected will 
continue to be a legal issue for the courts to decide. 
The final question asks for specific trends to be iden­
tified from an analysis of court decisions. Most recently, 
the courts have upheld the right of school boards to impose 
regulations on dress and grooming as long as they are reason­
able and not arbitrary. Future litigation is needed to sub­
stantiate this most recent decision made by the courts. An 
extensive examination of trends emerging through examination 
of judicial decisions is rendered in the Conclusions section 
of this study. 
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Conclusions 
It is important to keep in mind the fact that not all 
courts will approach dress and grooming cases in the same 
way. Even when the legal issues appear to be identical to 
those in a case already decided, varying circumstances can 
produce entirely different decisions in subsequent cases. 
While conditions surrounding the cases may vary, common 
threads can be extracted, however. Based on an analysis of 
court decisions, conclusions concerning the legal aspects 
of teacher dress and grooming can be made: 
1. The courts have established two bases for the 
constitutional protection of teachers who object to regula­
tions controlling their dress and grooming. These include 
the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religion 
and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prohibiting the 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property of any person 
without due process of law 
2. The teacher is usually protected under the Consti­
tution if his appearance is seen as an expression of per­
sonality, heritage, race, or culture, as long as it does not 
impair the educational process 
3* When dress or grooming is considered to be a form 
of symbolic speech and is thus very close to pure speech, 
e.g., the wearing of black armbands, the First Amendment 
protection is high. 
k. Local school boards and administrators must be 
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prepared to establish a need for their dress and grooming 
regulations 
5. The teacher must bear the burden of proof and show 
that the regulation is arbitrary and discriminatory when the 
facts in the case indicate that the board has, within its 
implied powers, the right to enforce the dress or grooming 
regulation 
6. The school board must bear the burden of proof and 
demonstrate a rational relationship between the necessity 
and desirability of the rule if it is established that the 
constitutional rights of the teacher have been violated 
7. A teacher cannot be lawfully dismissed for his 
dress or grooming unless: (1) there is a published policy 
prohibiting the dress and grooming, (2) the teacher is given 
notice of the policy and of the consequences of not adhering 
to itj and (3) a hearing is held to judge the specific 
alleged violation 
8. The courts usually treat rules of dress differently 
from rules of grooming because clothing can be more easily 
changed after the teacher leaves the school grounds than can 
a grooming style 
9. The courts generally uphold dress codes imposed by 
school officials as long as they are reasonable and are not 
enforced discriminately 
10. A grooming regulation is usually struck down by 
the courts unless the school board can prove that the 
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teacher's grooming is causing disruption of the educational 
process, collapse of student discipline, or that his appear­
ance is untidy 
11. While the courts have been divided on the issue 
concerning the wearing of religious garb by public school 
teachers, the most recent court decision has upheld a 
teacher's right to appear in the classroom dressed in this 
garb, as long as the teacher does not impart religious 
doctrine to the students 
12. School boards and administrators are not immune 
from liability for damages in cases involving the infringe­
ment of constitutional rights in enforcing dress and grooming 
codes 
13* Determining what aspects of a teacher's appearance 
are constitutionally protected will continue to be a legal 
issue for the courts to decide 
Again, it should be reiterated that the United States 
Supreme Court has yet to hear a case concerning the dress 
and grooming of teachers. It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine individual cases and the circumstances surrounding 
them before assuming that legal precedents established in 
one case might be applicable to similar cases. 
Recommendat ions 
It was not the intent of this study to determine what 
effect teacher dress and grooming have on the educational 
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process. Rather it was to provide appropriate information 
regarding the legal and educational aspects of these prac­
tices to assist decision makers in formulating policies 
which will be both educationally and legally sound. 
Policy decisions have been and continue to be left to 
the discretion of local school officials. Without question, 
some restrictions, including those dealing with the dress and 
grooming preferences of teachers, are necessary if the public 
schools are to function in an orderly fashion. These 
officials, however, must guard against the adoption of any 
unreasonable regulations which might impair or deny a teacher's 
protected constitutional rights. 
A plea of ignorance will no longer be accepted as a 
legal excuse for having violated a teacher's constitutional 
rights, nor will it provide an escape from the ensuing 
personal consequences of having committed such a violation. 
In order to ensure that the constitutional rights of all 
teachers are protected, school boards should adopt a written 
plan to be followed when and if such policies are initiated. 
Failure to do so will likely result in long and costly court 
action. 
Based on the results of this study, the following guide­
lines concerning teacher dress and grooming have been formu­
lated. These guidelines are based on legal principles 
established through the courts in cases related to these 
issues. While these appear to be legally acceptable criteria 
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to follow, school officials need to keep in mind that indi­
viduals who feel that their constitutional rights have been 
abridged may still initiate judicial grievances. 
Guidelines for Teacher Dress and Grooming Policies 
1. School boards must be able to justify that a com­
pelling and overriding governmental interest is at stake, 
and that the regulation of dress and grooming is the only 
method of protection, since judges seek evidence rather 
than opinions or moral assertions 
2. Guidelines should be cooperatively developed 
between teachers and school officials 
3. All dress and grooming regulations should be reason 
able and enforced in a nondiscriminatory manner 
k. Dress codes should be simple but not vague; more­
over, dress and grooming codes that are authoritarian or 
arbitrary are likely to be tested in court 
5. School boards must establish due process procedures 
for teachers in cases where disciplinary action, including 
suspension or dismissal, results from a particular dress or 
grooming style 
6. Teachers should be thoroughly informed as to the 
guidelines established by the school system in regard to 
dress and grooming 
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Concluding Statement 
Both the changing values of society and the effect of 
litigation have certainly had an impact on school board-
imposed dress and grooming regulations. This is especially 
evident in systems where policies have been challenged. 
Increasingly school administrators are liberalizing dress 
and grooming codes for teachers in the hope of avoiding 
such lengthy litigation. 
While no school board plan or set of guidelines will 
ensure against the initiation of court action by individuals 
who feel their rights have been violated, school boards and 
school administrators can reduce the probability of litiga­
tion by formulating and implementing a set of guidelines 
governing teacher dress and grooming. 
Fashion within a society is an everchanging phenomenon. 
Although there has been an increasing tolerance of extremes 
in fashion and a resultant reduction in litigation of this 
area, school boards and school officials must still bear 
responsibility for the orderly and efficient conduct of the 
educational process. Both the courts and educational stan­
dards demand, however, that school boards and administrators 
exercise a degree of judgment in their decisions. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
The very limited research that has been conducted con­
cerning the importance of teacher dress and grooming as it 
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affects studentsi makes it impossible to substantiate the 
scattered results. In the studies reviewed in this paper, 
college students were used as the sample populations. Serious 
attention should be directed to further exploration of this 
area using more varied age groups as samples. The results 
of such research would give school authorities more con­
fidence in establishing or ignoring dress and grooming regu­
lations for teachers. 
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